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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, considerable legal scholarship has focused on the 
liabilities of corporate boards of directors.1  The composition and procedures of 
corporate boards, and innumerable proposals to reform the same, have spawned 
other countless books and articles.2  No doubt recent corporate scandals will once 
again produce the question “Where were the directors?” and lead to still more 
lawsuits against directors, and more calls for reform.3  Yet, given the constant 
interest in, and litany of complaints about, corporate boards, perhaps more 
scholars should ask why corporation laws in the United States, and, indeed, 
around the world, generally call for corporate governance by or under a board of 
directors.4  After all, there are other governance models for a business.5
1 E.g., Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, & Stephen A. Radin, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. 
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1619 (2001); Peter Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: 
The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 179 (2001); Marlene A. O’Connor, How Should 
We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors’ Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 954 (1993); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate 
Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DePaul L. 
Rev. 655 ((1992); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 945 (1990); Lawrence Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Director’s Negligence Liability, 66 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 37 (1990); Bradley & Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate 
Governance, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1989); Charles Hanson, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: of the Duty of 
Care and the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. Law. 1237 (1986); __Cohn, Demise of the 
Directors’ Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 
62 Tex. L. Rev. 591 (1983); Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors’ Liability for Negligence, 
1972 Duke L.J. 895; Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 
Bus. Law. 35 (1966). I confess I have contributed my small share to the literature treating corporate directors 
primarily as a target for legal liability.  E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW ch. 4 (2000); 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion? 67 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 287 (1994).
2 E.g., Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 203-210 (2d ed. 2001); 
American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.02, 3A.01-3A.05 (1994); Melvin A. Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 149-185 (1977); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: 
Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. Corp. L. 349 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The 
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921 (1999); Lauri 
Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 898 (1996); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995); American Bar Association, Section on Business Laws, Committee on Corporate Laws, 
Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 49 Bus. Law. 1243 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991); Arthur J. 
Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Sec. 3, p. 1 (Oct. 29, 1972).
3 E.g., Douglas M. Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to 
Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 989, 1014-1021 (2003); James D. Cox, Managing and 
Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 
1077 (2003); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 
38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 855 (2003); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe 
on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 911, 927-932 (2003); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some 
Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233,__ (2002); Klaus J. Hopt, Modern Company and Capital Market 
Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron, working paper available on the SSRN 
database (2002).
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 For a discussion of the leading scholarship addressing this subject, see text accompanying notes __ 
infra.
5 E.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) § 401(f);Uniform Partnership Act (1914) § 
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This paper seeks to add to the literature on why boards exist.  Moreover, 
it does so by taking a very different approach in searching for an answer.  Instead 
of theorizing, this paper examines historical sources in order to look at how and 
why an elected board of directors came to be the accepted mode of corporate 
governance.  The story of how and why corporate boards arose turns out not only 
to be interesting in its own right, but it shows that the original purpose for having 
boards was quite different from the purposes argued based upon current 
economic and organizational theory.  This insight, in turn, may help explain the 
frustrating dissonance between what corporate law currently expects of boards, 
and what boards, in fact, do.
This examination of the historical and political origins of the corporate 
board of directors will proceed in four parts.  To provide a starting point against 
which to address the history of corporate boards, Part II of this paper explores the 
current puzzle presented by the board of directors as an institution.  The puzzle 
arises because of a clash between the model of the corporate board as the 
supreme body elected by the shareholders to ensure governance of the company 
on the shareholders’ behalf, and the reality of the minor role that corporate 
boards actually play in the governance of most companies.  With this background 
in place, Part III of this paper traces the historical roots of corporate boards.  This 
will entail a reverse chronological tour all the way back to the antecedents of 
today’s corporate board in fourteenth through sixteenth century companies of 
English merchants engaged in foreign trade.  In Part IV, this paper turns from 
when and how corporate boards developed, to address the underlying concepts 
and purposes behind the adoption of the antecedents of today’s corporate boards.  
This part shows how the antecedents of today’s corporate boards found their 
genesis in the political theories and practices of medieval Europe that, although 
hardly democratic, often called for the use of collective governance by a body of 
representatives.  Finally, this paper concludes in Part V with some thoughts as to 
what this history tells us about the role and purpose of a corporate board.  
Specifically, the historical and political origins of the corporate board suggest 
that the current frustration with corporate boards may arise from confusing an 
institution of political legitimacy with goals of business efficiency.
II. THE CURRENT PUZZLE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
A. The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance
American corporation statutes provide, with minor variations in 
language, that a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of its 
board of directors.6  This board-centered model of corporate governance is not 
only the universal norm in American corporate law, it is also the prevailing 
18(e)(providing for governance of a partnership by all partners in the absence of agreement to the contrary); 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), Prefatory Note (purpose of the new Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
is to provide a form of business for people who want strong central management, strongly entrenched, and 
passive investors with little control).  See also text accompanying notes __ infra (showing that boards 
commonly do not do much to govern corporations anyway).
6 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(a).
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model of corporate governance around the world.7  Yet, viewed in a literal and 
narrow manner, to say that a corporation shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors does not say that much.  After all, someone must 
manage a corporation.  The substance of this model of corporate governance 
comes from three underlying concepts.  These concepts involve the relationship 
of the directors to the shareholders, the relationship of the directors to each other, 
and the relationship of the directors to the corporation’s executives.
The first underlying concept of the board-centered model of corporate 
governance is that shareholders elect (normally annually) the directors.8  To see 
the significance of this concept, one can compare it with other models.  Under the 
partnership law default rule, the owners of the firm (the partners), simply by 
virtue of being owners, manage the partnership.9  By contrast, the corporation’s 
owners (the shareholders), by virtue of being shareholders, have no right to 
manage the corporation.10  Their only right is to elect directors, and to vote on 
matters the directors submit (either under compulsion of statute11 or voluntarily12) 
for shareholder approval.  Another extremely common governance model in 
partnerships, and in other non-corporate forms of business,13 is for an agreement 
among the owners to specify who shall be the managers of the business.14  Yet 
another scheme would be management by a self-perpetuating oligarchy of 
managers.15  The corporate scheme of periodic elections is obviously different, in 
theory if not in fact, from contractually designated or self-perpetuating managers.
The second concept underlying the board-centered model of corporate 
governance is that a group composed of peers acting together makes the 
7 E.g., Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN THE 
EUROPE AND THE U.S.A.__ (1988)(use of boards in Europe); Christopher L. Heftel, Survey, Corporate
Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. Haw. L. Rev. 135, __ 
(1983)(requirement for board in Japan); Howard Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing in the 
People’s Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. Int’l L. 399, __ (1995)(requirement for board in China).  An important 
caveat to this statement comes from the German two-tier board model under which there is both a supervisory 
board and a management board.  E.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate 
Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1819, 1823-1826 (1996).  For a 
discussion of how and why the corporate board of directors spread around the world, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, 
The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors 33 Stetson L. Rev. __ (2004).
8 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03(c); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 211(b).  An important exception to the world-
wide acceptance of this concept is the German invented system of co-determination, under which employees 
elect up to half of the corporation’s directors.  E.g., Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: 
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1338, __ (1984).
9 E.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) § 401(f);Uniform Partnership Act (1914) § 18(e).
10 E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.3a (2000).
11 See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 11.04(b)(requiring shareholder approval for a merger); Del. Gen. Corp. Law 
§ 251(c)(same).
12
 As, for example, when directors submit conflict-of-interest transactions for shareholder approval.  
See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.63 (dealing with the impact of shareholder approval of conflict-of-interest transactions); 
Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 144(a)(2) (same).
13
 And often attempted in derogation of the board-centered model of governance in corporations as 
well.  See text accompanying notes __ infra.
14 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, BUSINESS PLANNING 239, 245-246 (discussing and giving 
examples of agreements designating managing partners or managers of an LLC).  The traditional limited 
partnership encompasses this approach as part of its basic governance model.  In this model, some owners 
(general partners) manage and face unlimited liability, while other owners (limited partners) agree to relinquish 
a role in management in exchange for limited liability.  E.g., Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985) § 303(a).
15
 Many Dutch corporations follow this sort of pattern (except insofar as qualified by the right of 
employees to object to the labor representatives selected by the board).  E.g., Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee 
Jr. & Ronald J. Gilson, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 54 (5th ed. 2000).
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decisions.  Again, the significance of this concept becomes clear if one compares 
it to other governance schemes.  Many businesses have one person who single-
handedly makes at least the ultimate decisions.16  By contrast, the historic rule, 
and still prevailing norm, is that corporate boards consist of more than one 
director.17  As businesses or other organizations grow, group decision-making 
commonly replaces the solitary decision-maker.  Nevertheless, this is often a 
hierarchical group.18  In such a group, all members might have input, and the 
group often strives toward consensus, but, at least as a legal matter, one person 
has the ultimate power to make the decision.19  By contrast, the corporate board 
norm is that all directors have an equal vote, and majority rule prevails in the 
event of differences.20  Another alternative, often employed in conjunction with 
hierarchical group decision-making, is to subdivide authority among 
individuals.21  By contrast, the longstanding corporate law rule is that directors 
lack any authority to act as individual directors; rather, the directors only have 
authority when they act as a group through board meetings.22
The third concept embedded in the board-centered model of corporate 
governance is that the board has the ultimate responsibility for selecting and 
supervising the corporation’s senior executives (especially its chief executive 
officer).  Actually, corporation statutes often allow, and a rare corporation’s 
bylaws might provide, for shareholder election of the corporation’s president or 
other senior officers.23  Nevertheless, the overwhelming practice is for the board 
to appoint the chief executive officer and other senior corporate officials.24
Moreover, courts have held that arrangements, which deprive boards of the 
ultimate power to control officers or other individuals in managing the 
corporation, violate the statutory provision commanding that corporations be 
managed by or under the direction of the board.25
16
 This, of course, is the way a sole proprietorship typically operates.
17 See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03 Official Comment 1; Edwin J. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close 
Corporation – The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 Geo. L.J. 1145,__ (1966).  More recently, 
amendments to corporation statutes have allowed single-person boards. E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03.  See also Cal. 
Corp. Code § 212(a)(allowing less than three board members if the corporation has less than three 
shareholders). 
18 E.g., ___.
19
 The famous anecdote of President Lincoln and his cabinet provides an illustration.  The story goes 
that Lincoln put a decision to his cabinet, all of whom voted no.  Lincoln voted aye.  Lincoln then announced 
that the “ayes have it.”  E.g., __.
20 See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.24(c).
21
 This, in fact, describes the typical corporate management structure below the board level.  E.g., 
Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 5, 9-11 
(1989).
22 E.g., Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879).  A minor variation on this rule exists 
under common corporate statutes which allow board action through unanimous written consent.  E.g., M.B.C.A. 
§ 8.21.  Also, directors might act through committees.  E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.25.
23 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 142(b) (officers appointed by the board or as provided in the 
bylaws).  But see M.B.C.A. 8.40(b) (the board appoints officers; albeit officers can appoint other officers if 
authorized by the board or bylaws).
24 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note __ at 162-163.
25 E.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 
(1948); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal.App.2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953).  See also Grimes v. 
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (acknowledging the rule, but not finding an impermissible delegation).  An 
obvious exception to this exists if the statute allows a specific sort of arrangement which deprives the board of 
authority.  See text accompanying notes ___ infra.
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B. Rationalizations For The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance
Most literature dealing with the corporate board of directors takes the 
existence of this institution as a given.26  Nevertheless, a number of writers have 
suggested various rationales for this governance structure.
1. The Need for Central Management
A simple-minded rationale often expressed for the board-centered model 
of corporate governance is that businesses with numerous owners need “central 
management.”27  The basic notion is that it is impractical to have numerous 
owners – especially if they own freely tradable interests – constantly meet 
together to make decisions for the firm.  This certainly explains why firms with 
numerous owners might not wish to follow the partnership law default rule under 
which all owners participate in managing the firm.  Indeed, writers typically list 
the desirability of central management as one reason why persons establishing a 
business anticipated to have numerous owners might prefer to operate through a 
corporation rather than a partnership.28  Yet, this rationale fails to justify most of 
the concepts that underlie the board-centered model of corporate governance.
The need for central management fails to explain why shareholders 
annually should elect the board.  As stated above,29 agreements governing many 
non-corporate business organizations with numerous owners specify who will be 
in charge of the business, rather than providing for periodic elected terms.  
Alternately, a self-perpetuating oligarchy would provide for central management.  
More fundamentally, the need for central management does not explain why this 
management should take the form of a group acting together as peers.  A sole 
decision-maker would provide central management.  More realistically in a large 
business, why not provide for decision-making through a hierarchy leading to a 
chief executive officer?     
2. Group Decision-making
A recent article by Stephen Bainbridge30 moves beyond the need for 
central management in asking why corporate law calls for a board, rather than 
just a chief executive officer, to be at the apex of the corporation’s management.  
He points to behavioral psychology studies which suggest that groups, such as 
corporate boards, often produce better decisions than can single individuals when 
it comes to matters of judgment.31
26
 See notes 1 through 3 supra.  But see Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of 
Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696 (1960)(questioning the need for a board of 
directors in all corporations).
27 E.g., Robert Clark, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.4 (1987).
28 E.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 Neb. L.Rev. 627, __ (1979).
29
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
30
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
31
 The notion that groups might reach better decisions than individuals is hardly new or unique to 
corporate law scholarship.  Proponents of the jury system often point to this rationale.  E.g., Micheal J. Saks, 
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Presumably, it was not Professor Bainbridge’s intent to justify all aspects 
of the board-centered model of corporate governance in pointing to better 
decisions from groups versus individuals.  For example, he does not explain why 
shareholders annually should elect the group (as opposed to some agreed 
designation of the managing group or the use of a self-perpetuating oligarchy).  
Even as to the central thesis, however, the question remains whether the evidence 
Professor Bainbridge cites is sufficient to establish that peer group decision-
making, as contemplated by the board-centered model of corporate governance, 
is superior to hierarchical group decision-making.  In other words, while the 
multiple input found in groups often leads to superior decisions than made by a 
single individual, it is less clear from experimental studies of group decision-
making whether this requires the group to act as peers, with disagreements 
ultimately resolved by majority rule, rather than as a “cabinet” to a single person 
who has the final say.  This is not an abstract quibble, since most observers of the 
large corporation assert that the predominant decision-making mode, in reality, is 
hierarchical group decision-making.32  Indeed, even the sort of fundamental 
strategic decisions normally thought of as within the board’s purview, in fact, 
typically are made by a group consisting of the chief executive officer and the 
senior executives in charge of the major divisions or responsible for key 
functions.33  To the extent directors, as such, provide input for such decisions, 
this commonly occurs through informal conversations with a few more 
influential members of the board, rather than at a board meeting.34  Later, this 
paper shall address why, in a publicly held corporation, hierarchical group 
decision-making tends to replace peer group decision-making regardless of 
existence of a corporate board – thereby rendering this attempt to justify boards 
rather theoretical.35
3. Representation of Corporate Constituents and Mediating Claims to          
Distributions
Yet a different explanation for the use of corporate boards focuses on the 
need to mediate the competing claims of those who have an interest in 
distributions from the corporation.  Proponents of this explanation vary in terms 
of which claimants the board exists to mediate between, and whether the need for 
a board arises from the desirability of the various claimants having representation 
on the decision making body, or the need for a decision making body to be 
independent from the various claimants.
Probably the most traditional variation of this rationale suggests that 
Book Review: Blaming the Jury (review of JUDGING THE JURY by Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar) 75 Geo. 
L.J. 693, 706-707 (1986). 
32 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note __ at 140-141.
33 E.g., Interview with John Scriven, former General Counsel of Dow Chemical Corporation 
(October 8, 2002).
34 E.g., Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time 
for Reality, 39 Bus. Law. 1477, __ (1984).
35
 See text accompanying notes __ infra.
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boards exist so that large shareholders36 can elect themselves or their nominees as 
directors in order to protect their interests in distributions.  Empirical support for 
this variation purportedly arises out of a recent study conducted by Morten 
Bennedsen of Denmark.37  Professor Bennedsen attempted to look at the motives 
for using boards of directors by studying a large sample of Danish firms formed 
as anpartsselskaber (an “AN”).  The Danes modeled this business form on the 
German GmbH.38 Danish law does not require ANs to possess a board of 
directors, but, nevertheless, Professor Bennedsen’s study of such firms found that 
a little less than one-fifth of his sample used a board governance structure, 
including more than half of the firms with three to five owners, and two-thirds of 
the firms with more than five owners.  Based upon highly indirect statistical 
evidence,39 Professor Bennedsen argues that a motive for using boards in the 
closely held companies he studied was to protect non-controlling shareholders 
from exploitation by controlling shareholders, particularly in regard to 
distributions from the company.
It is impossible to assess Professor Bennedsen’s study without much 
more information about the specific control arrangements in the firms he studied.  
It is true that boards provide a means by which non-controlling owners might 
obtain some say in firm management, including regarding corporate distributions.  
Nevertheless, the traditional wisdom from the experience of closely held 
corporations in the United States is that the board-centered model of corporate 
governance is far more likely to allow controlling shareholders to exploit non-
controlling shareholders, than are other modes of management, such as provided 
by the partnership default rules, or might be found in a well-drafted shareholders 
agreement.40  Consider, for example, the impact of the underlying concept of the 
board-centered model of corporate governance that the shareholders periodically 
elect the directors.  This has been a recipe for controlling shareholders to bounce 
non-controlling shareholders off of the board of closely held corporations 
whenever controlling shareholders feel like squeezing non-controlling 
shareholders out of any say in corporate governance.41  Of course, there are 
mechanisms, to which all parties can agree before any dissension, for ensuring 
non-controlling shareholders remain on the board.42  By comparison, however, 
even without special preplanning, partnership law ensures all owners a say in 
management, since (barring other agreement) partners, simply by virtue of being 
36
 A shareholder with only a small percentage of the outstanding stock lacks the power, even with 
techniques such as cumulative voting, to elect oneself or one’s nominee to a corporate board.  E.g., Gevurtz, 
supra note __ at § 5.2.1a
37
 Morten Bennedsen, Why Do Firms Have Boards? working paper available on the SSRN database 
(March 2002).
38 Id at 5.  “GmbH” is short for Gesellschaft mit beschrantkter Haftung, which means company with 
limited liability.  The basic idea is to allow limited liability, but without all the requirements imposed on 
publicly held corporations.  E.g., Henry P. deVries & Friedrch K. Juenger, Limited Liability Contract: The 
GmbH, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 866, 867-868 (1964). 
39
 Professor Bennedsen draws inferences regarding the probable motives for use of boards from 
certain statistical correlations (as, for example, the relationship between the dispersion of stock and the use of a 
board).  The validity of these inferences is well beyond the scope of this paper.
40 See, e.g, F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert Thompson, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS § 2.10 (2d ed. 1985).
41 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976)(but 
holding the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder).
42 E.g. Gevurtz, supra note ___ at 477-491.
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partners, are entitled to participate in managing a partnership.43  Moreover, even 
if non-controlling shareholders remain on the board, the underlying concept that 
corporate boards act by majority rule (as opposed to following an advance 
agreement, as in a partnership contract) serves to allow the majority shareholders 
in a closely held corporation to gain disproportionate distributions at the expense 
of non-controlling shareholders.44  Again, there are agreements that shareholders 
can make before dissension, through which minority shareholders can protect 
their rights to distributions from the corporation.45  Yet, such agreements act in 
derogation of the concept that the board, acting through majority rule, manages 
the corporation.  Indeed, in earlier years, courts often struck down such 
agreements for this reason.46  By contrast, the laws governing partnerships and 
other non-corporate business forms, not only contemplate, but encourage, 
agreements with respect to distributions and the like.47
A broader variation of this sort of rationale asserts that boards exist to 
mediate claims not just among shareholders, but also between shareholders and 
other corporate constituencies, such as managers, other employees, creditors, and 
perhaps even the community at large.  While strains of this notion go back in the 
United States at least to the famous Berle-Dobbs debate in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review,48 a recent article by Lynn Stout49 attempts to find 
empirical evidence that shareholders grant power to the board for this reason.  In 
this modern iteration, the argument is that various groups – equity investors, 
lenders, managers, other employees, and the like – all make contributions 
necessary to corporate revenues, and all expect some distribution from those 
revenues.  Indeterminacy in the ultimate value of all these contributions toward 
producing revenue makes it extraordinarily difficult to come up with ex ante 
contracts that will adequately compensate, but not over compensate, each 
claimant.  This, in turn, suggests the need for a mediating body with the power to 
make ex post decisions about distributions.  Professor Stout argues that 
shareholder acquiescence in devices, such as poison pills, that insulate boards 
from shareholder control evidence that shareholders themselves have concluded 
that boards exist for this purpose.
The question of whether directors should have either a duty or a right to 
look out for the interests of contributors to the corporate enterprise other than the 
shareholders (except insofar as doing so advances the interests of the 
43
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
44 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (but holding 
the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder). 
45 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note __ at 499-505.
46 E.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).  As discussed later in this paper, 
corporate law now generally allows such agreements.  See text accompanying notes __ infra.
47 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 72 
Wash. U.L.Q. 497, 504-505, 508-509 (1995).  This discussion suggests that majority or controlling shareholders 
might actually prefer board governance.  Yet, if the majority or controlling shareholders desire to cut off the 
minority from either distributions or a voice in running the business, a system under which owners, by majority 
vote, dictate distributions and elect senior officers to run the corporation (as in Wilkes, supra note __) would 
accomplish the majority or controlling shareholders’ objective even without a board.
48
 E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); 
A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932).
49
 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public 
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, working paper available on the SSRN database (November 13, 
2003).
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shareholders) has been a subject of considerable legal and economic policy 
debate.50  This article is not the occasion to replay the various arguments.51  For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to ask whether the rationale that the board exists 
in order to mediate between corporate constituents explains all of the attributes of 
the board-centered model of corporate governance.  It would if boards were 
composed of representatives of the various constituents.  In that event, one could 
understand why there should be an elected group at the apex of corporate 
management.  Hence, this rationale seems to explain the existence of the 
supervisory board with some representatives elected by the shareholders and 
other representatives elected by the workers under the German system of co-
determination.52  Yet, for the United States, and most of the world, the board-
centered model of corporate governance assumes a board elected by the 
shareholders.53  If the board is not to have elected representatives of each of the 
constituencies, what is the point of having a board?  Professor Stout’s answer is 
to view the board as an independent, rather than a representative, body; perhaps 
in the nature of a neutral arbiter.  Still, the norm that shareholders elect the 
directors seems inconsistent with this rationale.  After all, it is difficult to 
imagine that various corporate constituencies would have designed a system in 
which one body of claimants has the legal right to select whomever it desires to 
act as arbiter of distributions between the claimants.54
4. Monitoring of Management
The final rationale for the board-centered model of corporate governance 
represents the prevailing view.  This rationale is that boards elected by 
shareholders exist as a necessary tool to monitor corporate management.55
Typically, this view starts with the assumption that corporate hierarchy exists to 
gain the advantage of team production, while minimizing agency costs (shirking 
and disloyalty) by having higher-level agents monitor lower-level agents.56  The 
50 E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991); American Bar Association 
Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253 
(1990); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 121 (1991).
51
 For the author’s view, see Gevurtz, supra note __ at § 4.1.5.
52
 In fact, constituent representation was the reason for the German adoption of the supervisory 
board.  E.g., Klaus J. Hopt, __.
53
 See note __ supra.
54
 Professor Stout points out that collective action problems effectively blunt shareholder control 
over the composition of the board in public corporations.  Instead, as discussed below, management 
traditionally has had control over the proxy machinery and chosen the directors.  See text accompanying notes 
__ infra.  Yet, this still does not show that boards can act as independent arbiters; even if boards in public 
corporations may be more likely to favor senior management as opposed to the shareholders.  Moreover, the 
fortuitous happenstance that collective action problems undercut the norm of shareholder selection of directors 
applies only to public corporations without a controlling shareholder (or controlling shareholder group).  Hence, 
Professor Stout fails to explain the existence of boards in corporations other than publicly held corporations 
without controlling shareholder(s).  More significantly, the fact that controlling shareholders dictate the 
composition of the boards in most corporations fundamentally undercuts Professor Stout’s rationalization for 
boards even in public companies, since it shows that firms can and do overcome the ex ante contracting 
problems between different contributors without an independent mediating body.
55 E.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note __ at § 3.02; Eisenberg, supra 
note __ at 169-170.
56 E.g., Bainbridge, supra note __ at 5-7.
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problem becomes, however, who monitors the highest level monitors.  The 
traditional economics answer is that the shareholders, as the residual claimants, 
have the best incentives to monitor the highest-level agents.57  This answer, 
however, faces a practical difficulty in the publicly held corporation, since there 
are too many scattered shareholders to allow for efficient monitoring directly by 
the shareholders.  This, in turn, leads to the argument that the corporate board, 
elected by the shareholders, provides a solution to the practical difficulty of 
shareholders monitoring on their own behalf.58
The monitoring rationale provides an elegant answer to why the 
shareholders should elect the board and why the board should appoint the senior 
executives.  Interestingly, however, the rationale does not explain the need for a 
board, so long as the shareholders elect whoever stands at the apex of corporate 
management.  In other words, one might achieve the same monitoring effect by 
having the shareholders elect the corporation’s chief executive officer.  Yet, there 
is an even more fundamental problem with the monitoring of management 
rationale for the board-centered model of corporate governance.  The monitoring 
rationale rests upon a rather curious assumption.  The assumption is that 
shareholders, who are too numerous and disengaged to monitor management on 
their own behalf, will become sufficiently engaged and organized to select 
vigilant directors to perform the monitoring for the shareholders.  
C.   The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance Meets Reality
The reality of corporate governance differs in subtle, but important, ways 
from a model that posits that shareholders select directors, who select and 
supervise senior officers, who, in turn, carry out the board’s will.  The nature of 
this difference depends upon whether one is dealing with a corporation with very 
few shareholders (a closely held corporation) or a corporation with very many 
shareholders (a publicly held corporation).
1. Closely Held Corporations
In the closely held corporation, reality diverges from the board-centered 
model of corporate governance because the shareholders, directors and officers 
are the same people.59  In other words, instead of having a large group of passive 
shareholders elect directors (who may or may not be shareholders) to manage the 
company, in a corporation with few shareholders, all or most of those 
shareholders will elect themselves as the directors of the company.  Similarly, 
instead of having the board select officers who may or may not be directors and 
shareholders, in the closely held corporation, the shareholder-directors typically 
also will select themselves to be the officers.  Under these circumstances, the 
shareholders often simply view themselves as running the business as owners –
57
 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 783 (1972).
58 E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
Econ. 301, 311 (1983).
59 E.g., F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert Thompson, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (3d 
ed. 1988).
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much as partners operate.  As a result, having a board serves little evident 
purpose.
The reaction of corporate law to the divergence between the board-
centered model of corporate governance and the realities of practice in the 
closely held corporation increasingly has been to give up on any attempt to 
preserve the board-centered model of corporate governance as anything other 
than a default rule.  This is most evident in statutes that allow shareholders in 
close corporations to dispense with the board.60  Even without dispensing with 
the board altogether, modern corporation statutes commonly allow shareholders 
to make agreements which dictate who will be directors and what decisions the 
directors shall make.61
2. Publicly Held Corporations
The divergence between the board-centered model of corporate 
governance and reality in a publicly held corporation does not involve the 
melding of shareholders, directors and officers into the same few people, but, 
instead, involves the flow of power between these three groups.  Specifically, the 
board-centered model of corporate governance perceives power to flow from 
shareholders, who decide who will be the directors, to the directors, who select 
the corporate officers and set policy, to the officers.  In large measure, the reality 
in the publicly held corporation has been almost the reverse.  The officers, 
particularly the chief executive officer, commonly have decided who will be the 
directors and what policies the corporation will pursue.62  To understand why this 
inversion has taken place, we need to examine the incentives which impact 
decision making at the shareholder level and at the director level.
Shareholders in the publicly held corporation typically are “rationally 
apathetic;” in other words, the rational shareholder in a publicly held corporation
normally will conclude that it is not worthwhile to spend much time or effort 
worrying about control over the corporation.63  After all, the cost of trying to 
change corporate management is quite high – since the dissatisfied shareholder 
must seek support from numerous scattered other shareholders – while the 
rewards are relatively low, since the other shareholders will reap most of the 
gains.  In economics lingo, there is a huge “free rider” problem.  Of course, one 
might respond that the same problem exists when dealing with federal, state and 
local government elections.  A significant difference, however, exists between 
the options open to dissatisfied shareholders and the options open to dissatisfied 
citizens.  The shareholder who is displeased with management in a publicly held 
corporation can quickly and easily sell his or her shares.  This self-help remedy 
of selling out is often referred to as following the “Wall Street rule.”  It is much 
less practical for the dissatisfied citizen to pack up and move out of the 
jurisdiction. 
60 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 7.32(a)(1); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 351 (for statutory close corporations).
61 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 7.32(a); Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 218(c) (validating agreements regarding who 
shareholders will vote for as directors), 350 (validating agreements dictating actions of the board of a statutory 
close corporation). 
62 E.g., James D. Cox, Thomas L. Hazen & F. Hodge O’Neal, CORPORATIONS § 9.2 (1997).
63 E.g., Choper, Coffee & Gilson, supra note __ at 544.
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Compounding the rational apathy phenomenon is the incumbent 
directors’ control over the corporate proxy machinery.  Almost invariably, the 
corporation will pay for the incumbent directors’ (or their nominees’) solicitation 
of proxies.64  This is certainly the case if the election is uncontested, and 
normally is the case even in a contested election.  By contrast, challengers will 
need to foot their own solicitation expenses unless (at the very least) they win.65
This imbalance creates a significant financial disincentive for anyone to 
challenge the incumbent board.  The end result is that, unlike federal, state and 
local government elections, elections of corporate directors rarely are contested.66
The observation that shareholders in publicly held corporations do not 
really control the corporation by selecting the directors is known as the “Berle-
Means thesis” after the two professors who wrote a book in 1932 that recognized 
this phenomenon.67  The discussion so far, however, only explains why 
shareholders do not control the composition of the board; it does not explain why 
the officers do.  Nor have we explained why officers, rather than directors, 
control corporate decisions.  
To understand why officers, rather than directors, control the public 
corporation, it useful to divide directors into two types: “inside” directors and 
“outside” directors.  “Inside” directors refers to directors who also work full time 
for the corporation, in other words, directors who are also officers.  “Outside” 
directors refers to directors who are not full time employees of the corporation.  
A number of practical constraints traditionally have operated to curb the 
control that outside directors can exercise over the corporation.  Some of these 
constraints are obvious.  For example, outside directors have limited time to 
devote to the corporation.  After all, these are individuals who, by definition, 
might have full time employment somewhere else.68  Closely related to the lack 
of time is the quality of information available to the outside directors in making 
corporate decisions.  As a practical matter, the outside directors must rely on 
information presented to them by the corporation’s officers when making 
decisions.69  True, directors have a legal right to inspect corporate records.70  Yet, 
time constraints generally render this right more theoretical than actual.  Given 
these constraints of time and information, the board hardly can initiate much of 
any corporate strategy or decisions.  Instead, the board’s role largely falls to 
approval of such strategies and decisions as officers bring before the board.71
Even in the context of approving strategies and decisions made by the 
corporation’s officers, however, the board’s effective control tends to be 
64 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note__ at § 3.1b.
65 See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
66 E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (8th ed. 2000)(citing SEC and Georgeson & Co. data).
67
 Adolph Berle & Gardner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932).
68
 Among the sorts of individuals who commonly serve as outside directors on corporate boards are 
chief executive officers of other companies, bankers and lawyers.  E.g, William A Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr., 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 131 (8th ed. 2002).  
Even academics and former government officials who sometimes sit on boards have other things to do.
69 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note __ at 204.
70 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 16.05(a).
71 E.g., Manning, supra note __ at __.
Franklin A. Gevurtz
14
marginal.  This is so not only because most corporate decisions never come 
before the board, but also because a number of factors make it a rare case in 
which a board will veto an action proposed by the officers.  A couple of these 
factors we have just seen: Lack of time and lack of independent information 
make it difficult for outside directors to second guess the corporation’s officers.  
In addition, there are various biases that work against the outside directors 
second-guessing the corporation’s officers.  For example, outside directors might 
have relationships with the corporation or its officers that would make outside 
directors think twice about challenging the officers.72  Most fundamentally, 
however, inside directors, and particularly the chief executive officer, have 
controlled the corporate proxy machinery and decided who sat on the board.73
This may simply be the consequence of the normal tendency of those with the 
greater stake – in this event, the insiders whose jobs are on the line – to be more 
assertive in exercising control over the key levers of power.  At any event, if the 
officers, especially the chief executive officer, pick directors, the normal human 
instinct will be to select directors who are likely to defer to the officers.74
What about the inside directors?  Since they work full time for the 
corporation, presumably they do not face the same time or information 
constraints as the outside directors.  Yet, in evaluating the ability of the inside 
directors to manage the corporation in their role as directors, we must take 
cognizance of the two inconsistent realms in which the inside directors operate.  
As board members, the inside directors operate in what is supposed to be a 
collegial decision making process among equals, with differences resolved, if 
necessary, by majority vote.75  As officers, however, the inside directors operate 
in a hierarchical setting in which the chief executive officer has the last word.  
Moreover, the chief executive officer traditionally has dictated the junior 
officers’ prospects for retention and promotion.76  Ultimately, it is probably too 
much to expect that directors who are subordinate to the chief executive officer 
all but a few days per year are suddenly going to switch gears and second guess 
the chief executive officer at the board meeting.  Instead, while subordinate 
officers of the corporation may have a significant voice in developing policy –
indeed, effective chief executive officers often work by seeking consensus,77 and 
much corporate policy originates within the various divisions78 – the input of 
inside directors comes in their role as officers rather than co-equal board 
members.79
All told, the result has been to reduce the board of directors to an 
institution which, despite it formal role as the supreme governing body of the 
72
 The board of directors at Enron provided a good illustration of this problem.  E.g., Gordon, supra 
note __ at __.
73 E.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zapac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 Admin. Sci. Q. 60, 78 (1995).
74 E.g., Myles Mace, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY __ (1971).
75
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
76 E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, __ 
(1989).
77 E.g., Scriven, supra note__.
78
 This is particularly the case in the “M-form” management structure.  E.g., Oliver Williamson, 
Organizational Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 351, 366 (1983).
79 E.g., Mace, supra note __ at 119-120.
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corporation, in fact, does very little.80  This dissonance between the expected role 
for the board, and the realities of corporate governance, appears to be inherent in 
the nature of the institution.  One piece of evidence for this conclusion comes 
from the fact that complaints about director inaction go back through the history 
of corporate boards; appearing in sources ranging from classic articles of legal 
scholarship,81 to nineteenth century literature.82  Nor are such complaints limited
to boards in the United States.83  Moreover, despite claims of improvements in 
corporate board governance, recent scandals again have produced complaints 
about passive boards.84  Of course, the fact that large corporations have 
prospered, and have contributed to modern economic prosperity, suggests that 
there must be something right about the management structure of corporations –
notwithstanding complaints arising from periodic corporate meltdowns.  Still, it 
is difficult to read the work of economic historians without coming to the 
conclusion that the managerial developments which made corporations work are 
those – like the development of the U-form and M-form organizational structure 
– that occurred below the level of the board of directors.85
80 E.g.,Monks & Minow, supra note __ at 209 (“The primary conclusion of this chapter is that 
America’s boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to protect shareholders’ interests); Rita Komik, 
Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 Admin. Sci. Q. 163, 166-167 (1987) 
(modern board is a “co-opted appendage institution”); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality – Ten Years 
Later, 32 Rut. L. Rev. 293 (1979) (study reaffirmed results of earlier study as to director passivity); Mace, 
supra note __ at 107 (study finding that directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance, but often 
served as little more than “attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree”); Robert A. Gordon, 
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 143 (1966) (the board of directors in the typical 
large corporation does not actively exercise an important part in the leadership function).
81 E.g., William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1934) (pointing 
out in 1934 that a popular theme had become that directors should assume the responsibility of directing).
82 E.g., Anthony Trollope, THE WAY WE LIVE NOW 298-309 (1875) (“Melmotte [the chief 
executive officer of the company, and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion,] would speak a few slow words . . . 
always indicative of triumph, and then everybody would agree to everything, somebody would sign something, 
and the board . . . would be over”).
83 E.g., Oxford Analytica Ltd, BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
TRENDS IN G7 COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS (1992), reprinted in Monks & Minow, supra
note __ at 267 (in Japan, formal authority is held by the company president and the board of directors, but board 
meetings are infrequent and decisions are rubber stamped; real authority is held by the president and the 
operating committee composed of the president’s immediate subordinates); Monks & Minow, supra note __ at 
292 (the president director-general (PDG) of French companies wields almost unchecked control over the 
enterprise without the counter power of the board, whose composition and agenda the PDG controls; indeed, it 
is regarded as bad manners for the board to vote on a management decision); Mark J. Roe, Political 
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 568 (2000) (German corporate 
supervisory boards meet infrequently and their information has been weak).
84 E.g., The Way We Govern Now, The Economist 59 (Jan. 11, 2003) (discussion of poor board 
governance in light of corporate scandals involving Enron); Michael C. Jensen & Joseph Fuller, What’s A 
Director To Do? avail. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=357722  (Oct. 2002) (“The recent wave of corporate 
scandals provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as the top-level corporate 
control mechanism”); Gordon, supra note __ at __ (Enron’s board was a splendid board on paper, and its failure 
reveals a certain weakness with the board as a governance mechanism).
85 E.g., Richard S. Tedlow, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 13-24, 
56-60 (19__).  While the universal adoption of board governance for public corporations makes it difficult to 
perform an empirical study on the impact of proceeding without a board, various recent studies attempt to assess 
the impact of board composition and other corporate governance practices on corporate performance.  Much of 
the results have been inconclusive.  E.g., Hamilton, supra, note __ at 359-373 (studies have not produced 
consistent positive results from changes in corporate governance, such as increased use of independent 
directors); Bhagat & Black, supra, note __ (reviewing over 100 studies and finding no convincing evidence that 
independent directors improve firm performance).  Studies in less developed economies suggest perhaps a 
greater impact.  Mark Mobius, Issues in Global Corporate Governance in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN 
ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 47-48 (Low Chee Keong ed. 2002) (recent studies in emerging markets show 
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III. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CORPORATE BOARDS
Given the dissonance between the norm that corporations are supposed to 
be managed by, or under the direction of, an elected board, and the realities of 
corporate governance, it is fair to ask when and how the norm of board 
governance developed.  With the readers’ indulgence, this section will not 
address this subject by using the traditional forward narrative of a history book.  
Instead, it will trace the roots of corporate boards in the manner in which the 
researcher discovers such things – which is to begin with the more recent and 
work one’s way backwards in time until one cannot find earlier examples of the 
use of corporate boards.  In other words, we will follow the method of an 
archeological dig.
A.  American Corporate Legislation
The norm that the ultimate power over corporate management resides in 
an elected board has always existed in American corporation statutes.  The law 
commonly considered to be the first general incorporation statute, New York’s 
1811 act,86 provided that “the stock, property and concerns of such companys 
[sic] shall be managed and conducted by trustees, who, except for the first year, 
shall be elected at such time and place as shall be directed by the by laws of said 
company . . ..”87  Of course, current corporate statutes typically refer to 
“directors,” rather than “trustees,”88 attempt to recognize reality by calling for 
corporate management “by or under the direction of” the board, rather than “by” 
the board,89 and specify annual election by shareholders, rather than leave this to 
the bylaws.90  Still, New York’s statute shows that the basic norm of corporate 
board governance existed from the beginning of general incorporation laws.
The New York legislature was not being particularly creative in 
providing for board governance in 1811.  In fact, this provision seems simply to 
have codified the common governance pattern established under the individual 
legislatively granted charters through which corporations had previously come 
better stock performance of companies with so-called better corporate governance, including more independent 
boards).  Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how much of this result comes from having a board versus from 
other so-called good corporate governance practices, and also how much of improved market returns reflects a 
current desire by investors for stock of companies with so-called better corporate governance practices, and how 
much reflects actual improved performance by such corporations.
86
 Before New York’s statute, a couple of states had enacted narrow corporations laws addressing 
turnpikes or the like.  E.g., Harry C. Henn & John R. Alexander, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 12 (3d ed. 
1983).  For the most part, however, prior to this time, corporations came into existence by special legislation, 
which granted charters to individual corporations. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note __ at § 1.1.3a.
87
 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1811, ch. LXVII.
88E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(a).  Some types of corporations, such as mutual 
associations, however, often still use the term trustee.  E.g., Mich. Compiled Laws Anno. § 500.6834. 
89 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01(b); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(a).  The purpose of the “under the direction 
of” language is to make it clear that the statute does not command the board to engage in day-to-day running of 
the corporation.  E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01(b) Official Comment.
90 E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03(c); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 211(b).
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into existence.91  Take, for example, the 1791 charter of the Bank of the United 
States (often known as the first Bank of the United States92).  This charter 
provided for a board of 25 directors to be elected annually by the shareholders.93
The bank’s board, in turn, under the charter, annually appointed one of its 
members to be the bank’s president, and could appoint such other officers as the 
board deemed necessary.94  This governance structure was not unique to banking.  
As an illustration, look at The Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, 
which received its charter from the New Jersey legislature in 1791.  Alexander 
Hamilton (who also had a hand in the formation of the first Bank of the United 
States the same year) formed this nobly named corporation to produce paper, sail 
linens, women’s shoes, brass and ironware, carpets, and printed cloth.  The 
affairs of this corporation were under the management of 13 directors elected by 
the shareholders.  Interestingly enough, the collapse of this corporation provides 
an early American example of the failure of outside directors to monitor 
management.95
B.  English Antecedents
1. The Bank of England
Not surprisingly, the use of boards of directors by the early American 
corporations finds its apparent roots in similar provisions of English corporate 
charters.  The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provides one of the clearest 
examples of English influence on American practice.  The Bank of England’s 
1694 charter provided for a board of twenty-four directors.96  Indeed, this charter 
seems to have pioneered the term “director.”97  A “court of proprietors” (what we 
would now refer to as a shareholders meeting) annually elected the Bank of 
England’s directors.98  Several facts show the influence of this charter on 
American practice.  An obvious fact is the borrowing of the term “director.”  
Another fact is the similarity in the size of the Bank of England’s twenty-four-
person board and the first Bank of the United States’ twenty-five-person board 
(which appears simply to have added one to the size of the English bank’s board 
in order to avoid tie votes).  Finally, in a provision which demonstrates influence 
because of its unusual nature, both the Bank of England and the first Bank of the 
91
 This pattern of governance continued to be found in the special charters granted corporations even 
after general incorporation laws first became available.  E.g., Joseph K. Angell & Samuel Ames, TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 121 (1832).
92
 The charter of the first Bank of the United States expired in 1811.  A charter created the second 
Bank of the United States in 1816.  E.g., Michael P. Malloy, BANK REGULATION § 1.3 (1999). 
93
 Bank Act [S-15] (Feb. 25, 1791) § 4. 
94 Id at §§ 4, 6.
95 E.g., Stanley C. Vance, CORPORATE LEADERSHIP: BOARDS, DIRECTORS, AND 
STRATEGY 3-5 (19__).
96 E.g., Cyril O’Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive, __ Bull. of the Bus. Hist. Soc. 55, 61 
(1952).  
97 E.g., Ronald R. Formoy, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 
21 (1923).  While the 1618 charter of the Africa Company called for a board of twelve “directors,” this 
terminology for board members did not catch on until the 1694 charter of the Bank of England.  E.g., William 
R. Scott, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK 
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United States imposed term limits on directors: The charter of the Bank of 
England prevented one-third of the directors of the bank from seeking 
reelection,99 while the charter of the First Bank of the United States prevented 
one-quarter of the directors from seeking reelection.100
In one important respect, however, American charters, including that of 
the first Bank of the United States, typically differed from the governance 
structure used by the Bank of England.  Unlike the common American practice as 
embodied in the charter of the first Bank of the United States, the charter of the 
Bank of England provided for election of the bank’s president by the court of 
proprietors, instead of appointment by the directors.101   In fact, it is somewhat 
ironic that American corporate governance has followed a sort of English 
parliamentary model under which the board appoints the company’s chief 
executive, whereas early English corporations often followed a model closer to 
American political practice of having the members directly elect the company’s 
chief executive.102  In any event, by the close of the eighteenth century, the Bank 
of England’s court of proprietors would simply approve the “house list” of 
candidates for directorships prepared by the existing directors103 – thus 
establishing the historical roots of the separation of ownership and control.  
While, in this regard, the Bank of England’s practice provided an early harbinger 
of the divergence of the board-centered governance model from the realities that 
prevail in the publicly held corporation, in another way, the Bank of England’s 
board followed the model.  At its inception, the Bank of England’s board met 
weekly to participate in running the bank, and, throughout the bank’s history, 
committees of Bank of England directors remained actively involved in the 
bank’s management.104
2. The Companies Established to Colonize America
The English corporations chartered to establish colonies in what became 
the United States of America probably also influenced early American 
corporations to adopt board governance.  In this case, however, the influence 
would have been subtler, since these companies had passed from the scene by the 
time Americans formed business corporations.  Still, it is likely that the pattern of 
board governance established by these colonizing companies – which continued 
to reverberate in the political institutions of the thirteen states – made Americans 
comfortable with the notion of corporate governing boards.
In 1606, James I granted a charter to two companies for purposes of trade 
and colonization in North America.  This charter granted what was earlier 
referred to as the London Company, and later became known as the Virginia 
Company, the right to plant a colony at any place between the 34th and 41st
parallels, while what was typically referred to as the Plymouth Company could 
plant a colony between the 38th and 45th parallels.  Each company consisted of 
99
 5 and 6 William and Mary, c. 20.
100
 Bank Act [S-15] (Feb. 25, 1791) § 7(2).
101 E.g., O’Donnell, supra note __ at 61.
102
 See text accompanying notes __ infra..
103 E.g., O’Donnell, supra note __  at 62-63.
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certain “knights, gentlemen, merchants and other adventurers” named in the 
charter, plus any other persons whom the original members of the company 
allowed to join the company.  The charter provided for governance through two 
types of councils.  Each colony would have a local resident council of thirteen 
members appointed by the king.  At the same time, the king would appoint a 
“Council of Virginia” of thirteen members in England for “superior managing 
and direction.”105  Notice that, while these companies followed a governance 
model based on boards, they did not at this point follow the model of a board 
elected by the members of the company.
James I’s attempt to deprive the members of the London Company of the 
power to select the council, however, proved unsatisfactory in the aftermath of 
the disappointing results from the Jamestown colony.  As a result, in 1609, a new 
charter was issued for the London Company, now called the “Treasurer and 
Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the First Colony 
of Virginia.”  This new charter placed the executive power over the company in 
the hands of a treasurer and deputy treasurer,106 and also established a new 
governing council in England.  Significantly, the company’s council was elected 
by the members of the company, rather than appointed by the king.107
Membership in the company, in turn, was available to persons who contributed 
money towards the colony.108  Hence, at this point, the London Company had 
adopted common features of the board-centered model of corporate governance.  
As far as local governance at the colony, the 1609 charter eliminated the local 
council and provided for control by a governor appointed by the company’s 
council in England.109
Three years later, yet another iteration occurred in the governance 
scheme for the London Company.  Interestingly, the new charter issued for the 
London Company in 1612 represented something of a move away from board 
governance, and an additional flow of power directly to the members of the 
company.  The 1612 charter limited the authority of the council, on its own, to 
handling “matters of less consequence and weight as shall from time to time 
happen touching and concerning” the colony.  To handle “matters and affairs of 
greater weight and importance,” such as the manner of government to be used, 
the disposition of land and possessions, and the settling and establishing of trade, 
the 1612 charter called for quarterly assemblies comprised of the council and 
members of the company sitting as one body.  These assemblies, which the 
charter entitled “The Four Great and General Courts of the Council and Company 
of Adventurers of Virginia,” also were empowered to elect members of the 
105 E.g., John P. Davis, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
STATE, vol. II, 158-159 (1904).
106
 The odd designation of the chief executive officer as the “treasurer” suggests that the principal 
contemplated focus for the company’s activities involved raising and spending money in support the 
colonization.
107 E.g., William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution 1 Ann. of the Amer. Acad. of Poli. 
& Soc. Sci. 538-539 (1890).
108
 The charter called for all persons who contributed money to the venture to be admitted to 
membership by action of the treasurer and any three existing members.  E.g., Davis, supra note__ at vol. II, p. 
162.
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council and officers of the company.  At this point, control of the local situation 
at the colony lay in the hands of a governor appointed by the assembly.110  In the 
end, however, this governance structure contributed to, or at least did not prevent, 
the company’s undoing.  In 1624, James I obtained the dissolution of the London 
Company through a quo warranto proceeding – writers disagree whether this was 
because of James’ displeasure with the company’s democratic experimentation,
or a justified frustration with dissension and mismanagement by the company’s 
members.111
Meanwhile, back at the Plymouth Company, the company received a 
new charter in 1620 under the name “The Council established at Plymouth, in the 
County of Devon, for the planting, ordering, and governing of New England, in 
America.”  As suggested by this name, the membership in the company became 
synonymous with membership in the governing council.112  The charter limited 
membership to forty members, who were named in the charter and held 
memberships for life, and who filled vacancies by vote of the existing members.  
Needless to say, this represents a substantial deviation from the model of 
governance through a board of representatives elected by the owners of the 
company.  After an unsuccessful effort to establish a colony at the mouth of the 
Kennebec River in 1607, the Plymouth Company largely confined its activities to 
granting other groups the license to establish colonies or trade in parts of the 
territory to which the Plymouth Company had received the exclusive rights in its 
charter.113
While the Plymouth Company itself did little to establish the model of 
corporate governance through elected boards, it indirectly played a role in 
spreading this model.  In 1628, John Winthrop and others secured from the 
Plymouth Company a grant of land from a point three miles north of the 
Merrimac River to a point three miles south of the Charles River.  The next year, 
after obtaining confirmation of this grant from Charles I, Winthrop and his 
associates obtained a charter to form a corporation named the “Governor and 
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England” (typically referred to as the 
Massachusetts Bay Company).  The governance scheme set out in the charter of 
the Massachusetts Bay Company borrowed from the London Company and 
exhibited features of the board-centered model of corporate governance missing 
from the Plymouth Company.  The charter called for a governor, deputy 
governor, and eighteen so-called “assistants.”  As we shall see later,114 the term 
“assistants” is one of the earliest English designations for what we now would 
call directors.  The charter named the first governor, deputy governor and 
assistants for the Massachusetts Bay Company, but called for the subsequent 
election of persons to hold these positions by the members of the company.  The 
charter called for at least monthly meetings of the governor (or deputy governor) 
and assistants to direct the affairs of the company.  Copying from the London 
110 Id at 540-541.
111 Compare Davis, supra note__ at vol. II, p. 169 (James I opposed grants of free and popular 
government), with Robert A. Devine, T.H. Breen, George M. Fredrickson, & R. Hal Williams, AMERICA: 
PAST AND PRESENT 38-39 (1984) (mismanagement led to dissolution).
112
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Company, the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company also called for four 
“great and general courts” attended by the governor or deputy governor, at least 
six assistants, and the members of the company, to take place every year.  These 
general courts had the power to elect officers for the company.115
There was one key difference, however, between the governance 
provisions of the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company and the governance 
provisions of the charter of the London Company from which the Massachusetts 
Bay Company copied.  Unlike the London Company’s charter, the charter for the 
Massachusetts Bay Company did not specify that the company’s general courts 
and council had to meet in England.  Accordingly, the members of the 
Massachusetts Bay Company – who were using the company structure to further 
a religious and political agenda – met in Massachusetts.116  As a result, the 
elected governing board of the Massachusetts Bay Company became, in effect, 
the Massachusetts colonial legislature.  The corporate charter for the 
Massachusetts Bay Company remained the governing constitution for the 
Massachusetts colony until 1691, when a new royal charter for the colony 
replaced the Massachusetts Bay’s Company’s corporate charter.  The 1691 
charter, however, preserved the existing governance structure, except that the 
king thereafter appointed the colony’s governor.117
The upshot was that the Massachusetts Bay Company had even more 
influence on the structure of American government then it did on the governance 
of American business.  The same is true of the London Company, whose 
members, in 1621, adopted an “Ordinance and Constitution” for the government 
of Virginia, which, copying from their own charter, called for the governance of 
the colony by a governor, council of assistants, and a general assembly at the 
colony.118  The governance structure established by the London Company for the 
Virginia colony in 1621 provided the model for other colonies in Maryland and 
the Carolinas, while the governance structure established by the Massachusetts 
Bay Company’s 1628 charter provided the model for other colonies in 
Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.119  In the end, as the American 
states began to charter corporations, the notion of an elected board may well have 
been comfortable because of its similarity to the governance scheme of the state 
legislatures; the irony being that the governance scheme of the state legislatures 
stemmed from the board governance of the corporations formed to colonize 
North America.
3. The Trading Companies
While both the Bank of England, and the companies established to 
colonize America, apparently influenced American acceptance of corporate 
board governance, it was the English trading companies that developed board 
governance as a model for a business corporation.
115 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. II, p. 173.
116 E.g., George Cawston & A.H. Keane, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 210 (1896).
117 E.g., Morey, supra note__ at 550.
118 Id at 542.
119 Id at 544, 550.
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a.  The Joint Stock Trading Companies
The charters of the famous English trading companies, such as the East 
India Company, the Russia Company, the Eastland Company, the Levant 
Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the South Sea Company, evidence 
the consistent use of governing boards.120  For example, at the outset of the 
seventeenth century, Queen Elizabeth I granted a charter to 216 knights, 
aldermen and merchants to become “a body politic and corporate” by the name 
of the “Governor and Company of Merchants of London, trading into the East 
Indies.”  The result was to create what came to be known as the East India 
Company.  The East India Company’s charter committed the direction of the 
voyages, and the management of all other things belonging to the company, to a 
governor121 and twenty-four persons called “committees”.  Hence, the title 
“committees” (like the title “assistants” encountered in the Massachusetts Bay 
Company) predated the title “director” or “trustee” as the label attached to the 
elected members of a corporation’s governing board.  The charter named Sir 
Thomas Smith as the first governor, but provided that the members of the 
company annually would elect the committees, who would chose from among 
themselves a governor.122
The charter of the East India Company was following well-established 
precedent in calling for the use of a governing board.  In 1554, Philip and Mary 
granted a charter to what came to be known as the “Russia” or “Muscovy” 
Company.123   The charter named Sebastian Cabot as governor for life, and 
provided for four “sad,124 discreet and honest” members to be consuls,125 and 
twenty-four members to be assistants.  Members of the Russia Company annually 
elected the consuls and assistants.126  Interestingly, while most records were lost 
in a fire, the extant records of the Russia Company suggest a familiar deviation 
between the role of the board called for in the charter of the Russia Company and 
the more limited role the board actually took.  For example, the members 
(stockholders), acting as a whole, seem to have taken a more extensive role in 
managing the company than suggested by the charter (which only empowered the 
members to elect the consuls and assistants).  Records show that the members at 
general meetings selected “factors” (agents) to represent the Company in Russia, 
120
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approved contracts and statements of account, and resolved disputed charges of 
private trading leveled against servants of the Company.  At the opposite 
extreme, on many occasions, the governor, perhaps with the input of a few of the 
major members, seems to have acted for the company.  By contrast, despite 
receiving broad powers in the charter, there is little in the records as far as actions 
by the board of assistants.127
In 1579, Elizabeth I granted a charter to The “Fellowship of Eastland 
Merchants” (commonly referred to as the Eastland Company).128  Under the 
charter, the government of the Eastland Company consisted of a governor, one or 
more deputy governors, and twenty-four assistants.  Members of the Eastland 
Company annually elected the governor and deputy governor(s), but, in an 
unusual provision, the assistants held office on good behavior.129
The Levant Company started life with a different governance structure.  
This company came into official existence in 1581 when Elizabeth I granted a 
charter to Sir Edward Osborn, Thomas Smith, Richard Staper and William Garret 
to become “The Company of Merchants of the Levant.”  The charter named 
Osborn as the Company’s first governor, but, with only four initial members, the 
charter did not reflect any need for assistants.  The charter authorized Osborn and 
Staper to admit up to twelve other English subjects into the company, while the 
queen retained the right to admit two more into the company.  In 1592, Elizabeth 
I granted a new charter to the company.  This new charter named fifty-three 
members, and authorized the company to admit additional members without the 
numerical limitations of the old charter.130  With more members, the governance 
structure now changed.  The new charter called not only for a governor, but also 
for the members to elect annually twelve assistants.  Growth in the company 
produced a new charter in 1605.  Admission into the company was now open to 
all merchants upon payment of a fee.  In terms of governance, the new charter 
increased the number of assistants to eighteen.131
English trading companies founded after the East India Company also 
had charters calling for governing boards.  For example, in 1670, the English 
government granted a charter creating the Hudson’s Bay Company – officially 
titled “The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into 
Hudson’s Bay” – for the purpose of trade in what is now Canada.  Under the 
charter, the proprietors of the company elected annually a governor, deputy 
governor, and a board of seven committees.132  In 1711, the infamous South Sea 
Company – officially named “Governor and Company of Merchants of Great 
Britain Trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for 
Encouraging the Fishery” – received its charter.  The principal business of the 
South Sea Company seems to have included equal parts holding British 
government debt and encouraging an ill-fated speculation in its own stock (the 
127 E.g., T.S. Willan, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RUSSIA COMPANY: 1553-1603 22-24 
(1959).
128
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so-called South Sea Bubble).133  The South Sea Company had a governor, sub-
governor, deputy governor, and a board of thirty directors.134  Sadly, the plea of 
ignorance asserted by many of the company’s directors during the investigation 
and prosecution following the company’s collapse in 1720135 is eerily reminiscent
of the response of directors to scandals ever since.
These English trading companies not only evidence the use of corporate 
governing boards going back almost half a millennia, they played a critical role 
in establishing the use of boards as the governance mechanism for the business 
corporation.  For example, the East India Company appears to have pioneered 
various aspects of modern board practice.  As discussed earlier in this paper,136 a 
key power of the typical modern corporate board – which is especially important 
if one views the principal role of the board to be monitoring the performance of 
corporate management – is the power to hire and fire the chief executive officer.  
The initial charter of the East India Company may have been the first (or at least 
the first well documented) corporate charter to grant the power to the governing 
board to elect the corporation’s governor, rather than leave this power in the 
hands of the company’s members.137  Interestingly, as mentioned above,138
American corporations were quicker to adopt this practice than did other English 
corporations.  Over the years, various further changes occurred in the governance 
of the East India Company, by successive charter or otherwise.  For example, 
during the eighteenth century, the committees elected a chairman and deputy 
chairman to preside over their meetings, thereby establishing an office of chair 
separate from that of governor139 – something pushed by reformers of boards 
today.140  Another example of governance practices introduced into the East India 
Company that remains common today comes from an act of Parliament in 1773.  
This act introduced staggered terms to the company’s board of what were by then 
referred to as directors, with one-quarter of the directors elected every year.141
The most critical innovation that occurred with these trading companies, 
however, did not involve a change in the structure of the governing board.  
Instead, it involved what was going on around the board.  These companies were 
undergoing a metamorphosis from so-called regulated companies – essentially 
guilds whose membership consisted of merchants conducting independent 
operations under the company’s franchise – into joint stock companies, in which 
voting power and economic return came from investing in a common enterprise.  
133 E.g., Edward Chancellor, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION ch. 3 (1999).
134 E.g., Scott, supra note __ at vol. III, pp. 295-296
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While this evolution did not alter the structure of the governing board, it 
fundamentally changed what the board was supposed to do.  The board turned 
from a regulatory body, which preserved an exclusive franchise on behalf of a 
group of merchants who conducted individual businesses, into a supervisory 
body, which had overall responsibility for running a business.142
The Eastland Company provides a good example of a regulated 
company.  The charter of the Eastland Company granted the merchants in the 
company the exclusive right among English subjects to trade with Scandinavia 
and the Baltic region (but not Russia).143  Such exclusive rights were typical of 
the English trading company charters, which attempted to carve up the world into 
a series of franchises.  So, the charter of the Russia Company granted the 
Company exclusive rights as far as English subjects to trade in Russia, as well as 
in “lands of infidels” discovered by merchants in the Company.144  The charter of 
the Levant Company granted members of this Company exclusive trading rights 
with Turkey.145  Perhaps most generous of all, the charter of the East India 
Company granted its members exclusive trading rights in a territory described as 
encompassing all of Africa, Asia and America from the Cape of Good Hope to 
the Straits of Magellan.146
As a regulated company, the Eastland Company did not conduct 
operations as a corporation.  Instead, the merchants who were the members of the 
company conducted trading operations, either individually or in ad hoc 
partnerships.147  This fact, in turn, leads to a critical question from the standpoint 
of the history of board governance: If a regulated company did not conduct 
operations as a corporation, what was the purpose of having a governing board?  
The answer is that the board adopted ordinances to govern the activities of the 
members of the company.148  For example, the board of the Eastland Company 
adopted a prohibition on “colouring” goods.149  Colouring referred to selling 
goods of a non-member merchant as a member’s own.  By operating in this 
fashion as undisclosed principals, non-members attempted to circumvent the 
company’s exclusive franchise.  As this example illustrates, the role of a board of 
a regulated company was not to have overall responsibility for operating a 
business, but, rather, to impose rules on individual merchants in order to preserve 
a monopoly.
The Russia Company may have been the first joint stock company.150  In 
the joint stock company, instead of each merchant trading in his own stock
(merchandise), the merchants subscribed to a fund that financed a combined or 
142 E.g., Willan, supra note __ at 19-21.
143 E.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note__ at 61.
144 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. II, pp. 97-98.
145 Id at 88-91.
146 E.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note __ at 87-88.
147 E.g., Willan, supra note __ at 19-20.
148 Id at 20.
149 E.g., Schmitthoff, supra note __ at 82.
150 E.g., Scott, supra note__ at vol. I, p. 17.  The discerning reader may have noticed that the Russia 
Company predated the Eastland Company, despite the fact that the Russia Company started as a joint stock 
company, while the Eastland Company was a regulated company.  This shows that the evolution from regulated 
to joint stock companies was an erratic, rather than a linear, process.  Indeed, the Russia Company, itself, 
regressed into a regulated company later in its life.  See note __ infra.
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joint stock of merchandise for trading by agents of the company – hence, the title 
“joint stock company” from which derives the current label of stockholder.151
There were a couple of motivations for the evolution from the regulated to the 
joint stock company.  The obvious is the greater need for financing, and greater 
risk of failure, as trading voyages went from the close (the Baltic) to the far.  
(The members of the Russia Company originally hoped to find a northeast 
passage to Asia.152)  The joint stock principle raised more money, and spread the 
risk among more participants, than did individual operations in the regulated 
company.153  There may have been another motivation.  Limiting operations to 
trading under the company’s direction financed through a joint stock fund could 
serve as a way to combat practices such as colouring.154
At its inception, the East India Company seems to have straddled the 
worlds of the regulated and the joint stock companies – so much so that 
historians disagree over whether the East India Company started as a regulated 
company and evolved into a joint stock company, or whether the East India 
Company was a joint stock company from the outset.155  The conflict arises from 
the fact that the original charter of the East India Company preserved the right of 
the members to trade individually under the company’s franchise, much as in a 
regulated company, and the fact that not all of the members in the East India 
Company subscribed to the early voyages financed on a joint stock basis.156  In 
any event, historians agree that during the first half of the seventeenth century, in 
lieu of having permanent capital, members of the East India Company subscribed 
to joint stock funds that would finance a certain number of trading voyages to 
India.  These funds then were supposed to be wound up and the proceeds 
distributed among the subscribers.  In the middle of the seventeenth century, a 
combination of accounting confusion caused by this system,157 and the 
continuing need to justify its monopoly,158 led to a restructuring in which a 
permanent joint stock fund replaced the earlier funds.159  Beyond moving to a 
permanent capital, two critical changes occurred in the rights of the members –
historians disagree whether these occurred in the middle or toward the end of the 
seventeenth century.  Voting rights began to depend upon the amount each 
151
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member invested in the permanent joint stock, instead of being available to all 
members.160  In addition, the company no longer granted members the right to 
trade on their own under the company’s franchise.161  The result of these two 
changes was to tie the benefits of membership in the English East India Company 
– both in terms of voting control and in terms of any economic return – entirely 
to a subscription into a common fund for the company’s activities, and thereby 
complete the transformation of the company from a confederation of merchants 
into a vehicle for passive investment by the general public.162
The development of the joint stock company, by setting the stage for 
transferable ownership interests in which voting power can depend upon the 
number of interests purchased and in which voting power might become widely 
dispersed among passive investors, obviously has tremendous implications for 
corporate governance.  It laid the groundwork for the separation of ownership 
from control, but also created the ability for today’s hostile takeovers.  For 
purposes of this paper, however, dealing as we are with the historical and 
political origins of corporate board, the development of the joint stock company 
has another impact.  The same board structure that existed to enact and enforce 
rules governing the conduct of independent merchants in the regulated company
(such as the Eastland Company) found itself pressed into service to manage a 
large business venture in the joint stock company (such as the Russia and East 
India Companies).  This occurred without any evident consideration as to the 
different nature of these tasks, or whether an institution developed for one task 
best fit the needs of the other function.
b.  The First English Trading Companies
The use of boards of “assistants” or “committees” by the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century English trading companies appears to derive from a pattern 
set by two of the earliest companies of English merchants engaged in foreign 
trade: The Company of the Merchants of the Staple, and the Company of 
Merchant Adventurers.  The history of these two organizations is even fuzzier 
than is the case with the joint stock and regulated corporations discussed thus far.  
For purposes of this paper, however, it is sufficient to focus on several facts 
about these two companies.  In each case, the company adopted governance by a 
160 E.g., Scott, supra note __ at vol. III, p. 465 (voting rights in the East India Company were limited 
in 1650 to one vote for each £ 500 contribution); Davis supra note __ at vol. II., pp. 129-130 (the new charter of 
1693 gave one vote for each £1000 in contribution, up to a maximum of ten votes).  
161 E.g., Samuel Williston, The History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 3 SELECT 
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 195, 200 (1909) (members lost the right to trade 
independently under the East India Company’s franchise toward the end of the seventeenth century); William 
Mitchell, Early Forms of Partnership, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 183, 
194 (1909) (members lost the right to trade independently under the East India Company’s franchise in 1654). 
162
 Interestingly enough, the Russia Company evolved in the opposite direction.  It started with a 
permanent capital, but disappointing results during later years led the members to demand a repayment of their 
capital.  Thereafter, the company began operating through subscriptions and periodic redistributions.  This 
practice, in turn, resulted in fewer members having a greater share in the company, and more complaints about 
the company’s monopoly becoming concentrated in the hands of a few.  These complaints, as well as the 
accounting confusion resulting from the lack of a permanent capital, finally led to the company becoming a 
regulated, instead of a joint stock, company.  E.g., Willan, supra note __ at 269-273.  The Levant Company 
followed a somewhat similar regression from joint stock to regulated company.  Id at 273.
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board coupled with a chief executive officer.  Further, these two companies 
apparently were the first companies of English merchants organized for foreign 
trade with at least some degree of the sort of exclusive rights from the crown that 
would motivate the later English trading companies to seek charters.  As such, 
the inevitable inference is that the board governance structure adopted by the 
Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers provided the model followed by the later English trading companies 
when the later English trading companies drafted charters calling for board 
governance.163  The other point worth noting is that neither the Company of the 
Merchants of the Staple, nor the Company of Merchant Adventurers, was 
anything remotely like a joint stock company.  Instead, these were regulated 
companies, like the Eastland Company, in which the role of the board was to 
enact and enforce rules governing the activities of individual merchants, rather 
than manage a business.
Broadly speaking, the Merchants of the Staple engaged in the export of 
English raw wool, while the Merchant Adventurers engaged in the export of 
English cloth, as well as other English manufactured goods.164  The Merchants of 
the Staple take their name from the fixed place (the staple) to which, at various 
times, English law limited all sales of raw wool exports.165  The system began 
with voluntary efforts at the end of the thirteenth century by Edward I to 
encourage all wool exports to go through one market (first at Dordrecht and then 
at Antwerp).  It appears that the English merchants handling these wool sales 
obtained a charter from the duke of Brabant (now part of Belgium) allowing 
them to hold assemblies, and, later, to elect a “mayor,” in order to govern the 
merchants’ affairs.166  The result seemingly was to establish something of an 
organized merchant society or company, but apparently with a simple 
governance structure built around an executive officer and decisions by all of the 
members.  The staple system became compulsory in 1313, with the establishment 
of a Mayor and Council of the Merchants of the Staple, who were empowered to 
choose a staple town for all wool exports.167  They first choose Saint-Omer (in 
Flanders), but tussles over where the constantly moving staple would be, and 
who would be allowed to trade, occupied the next half-century.  After the 
Ordinance of the Staple of 1353 brought the whole thing for a few years to 
fifteen English towns (each of which had its own Mayor of the Staple and 
supporting officers),168 the staple gravitated toward Calais (which was then under 
163
 Reinforcing this inference are the similarities in the composition of the boards of the Merchant 
Adventurers and the Russia and Eastland Companies (twenty-four “assistants” in each case), as well as the fact 
that many of the founding members of the Russia Company were members of the Merchants of the Staple or the 
Merchant Adventurers.  Willan, supra note __ at 21.
164
 Not surprisingly, this demarcation between the two companies was subject to some dispute, 
particularly once a decline in the wool trade motivated members of the Merchants of the Staple to sell cloth.  
E.g., Percival Griffiths, A LICENSE TO TRADE: THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CHARTERED 
COMPANIES 10 (1974).
165
 The interest of the Merchants of the Staple in such a limitation, particularly insofar as it could 
reduce competition and allow control over prices, is obvious enough.  The English kings saw this as a devise to 
extract revenues from the wool merchants.  E.g., Eileen Power, THE WOOL TRADE IN ENGLISH 
MEDIEVAL HISTORY 87-89 (1941).
166 Id at 95-96.
167 E.g., L.F. Salzman, ENGLISH TRADE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 289-290 (1931).
168 Id at 293.
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English control).  As a result, the Merchants of the Staple became the Company 
of the Staple of Calais.169  Significantly for purposes of this paper, a council of 
twenty-four governed the company in Calais (and, interestingly enough, for the 
two years between 1363 and 1365 also governed the town).170  Hence, the 
Merchants of the Staple, to some extent as early as 1313, and certainly by 1363, 
had adopted a system of board governance.
Despite its somewhat swashbuckling sound, “merchant adventurers” was 
a label used by merchants who engaged in the export trade of manufactured 
goods.  The early history of the merchant adventurers as an organized company is 
murky.  English merchants trading in Antwerp obtained a pair of charters from 
the dukes of Brabant in the thirteenth century, which allowed them to establish a 
mayor and a court (an assembly).171  It is unclear, however, whether the 
Company of Merchant Adventurers, as it ultimately became known, bore enough 
of a relationship to these earlier expatriate English merchants to support the later 
company’s efforts to claim this lineage, particularly insofar as the Merchants of 
the Staple also laid claim to at least the later of these charters.  Early in the 
fifteenth century, Henry IV of England granted a charter to English merchant 
exporters trading outside England (mostly in the low countries), which allowed 
the merchants to elect a governor over themselves.172  The role of the governor 
under the charter was to resolve disputes among the English merchants and to aid 
the English merchants in their claims against foreign merchants.  The governor, 
with the assent of the merchants (presumably through an open assembly), also 
could establish ordinances for the group and impose reasonable punishments 
upon merchants disobeying these ordinances.173  During the fifteenth century, 
merchant exporters operating from England, unlike their countrymen operating 
abroad, had no formal separate organization.  Instead, many of them apparently 
were members of the Mercers Company, a London merchant’s guild, where, by 
the middle of the century, they seem to have begun meeting as a separate group.  
By the late fifteenth century, the London merchant exporters had come to view 
themselves as a distinct fellowship with the title “Merchant Adventurers,” and 
evidently were operating in connection with the English merchants in the Low 
Countries.  This is evidenced by a 1485 petition to the English crown, in which 
the London merchant exporters designated themselves “Merchant Adventurers, 
Citizens of the City of London, into the parts of Holland, Zeeland, Brabant and 
Flanders.”174
In 1505, Henry VII took a critical step in bringing together the merchant 
adventurers as a coherent company.  He granted a charter to The Company of 
Merchant Adventurers, giving the Company a monopoly on trade in export of 
English manufactures; albeit, membership in the company had to be open to any 
169 E.g., Power, supra note __ at 96-99.
170 E.g, Griffiths, supra note __ at 7.  Some historical sources refer to there initially being twenty-six 
merchants in charge of the company at Calais, but this probably comes from adding the two mayors (one for the 
company and one for the town) to the twenty-four member council.  E.g., Salzman, supra note __ at 295.
171 E.g., Griffiths, supra note __ at 9.
172 E.g., E.g., Edward P. Cheyney, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 165 (1905).
173 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. II, pp. 74-75.
174 E.g., Griffiths, supra note __ at 10.
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English merchant who paid a fee.  More significantly for purposes of this paper, 
this charter authorized the company (which would be headquartered on the 
Continent, rather than in England) to elect “Four and Twenty of the most sadd 
[sic] discreet and honest Persons of divers [sic] fellowships” to be “Assistants” to 
the governor.175  The function of the governor and the assistants was to resolve 
disputes among merchants and to enact ordinances for the regulation of the 
members of the company.176  During the first half of the sixteenth century, 
merchant adventurers in English cities that perhaps were jealous of the London 
merchants’ dominance created their own companies of Merchant Adventurers.  
These companies often also employed a board governance structure, with elected 
governors and twelve or eighteen assistants.177  In 1564, however, Elizabeth I 
issued a new charter to the Merchant Adventurers.  This charter confirmed 
governance of the company in a governor, his deputy, and, again of most 
significance to this paper, twenty-four assistants, to be headquartered abroad, and 
who had jurisdiction over merchant adventurers wherever they operated.178
All told, both the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company 
of the Merchants of the Staple had governing boards whose structure matches, 
and evidently provided the model for, the governing boards of trading 
companies, such as the Russia, Eastland, and East India, companies.  As 
suggested by the charter of the Merchant Adventurers, the boards of the 
Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company of the Merchants of the 
Staple existed to resolve disputes and to pass ordinances regulating the conduct 
of the members.179  The upshot is that the corporate board of directors did not 
develop as an institution to manage the business corporation.  Rather, it is an 
institution the business corporation inherited when the business corporation 
evolved out of societies of independent merchants.  These earlier merchant 
societies or companies, in turn, apparently adopted boards to replace less 
structured governance under a combination of officers and decision-making by 
assemblies of the entire membership.
C.  Continental European Antecedents
While American use of corporate boards evidently traces to English 
practice, it would be a mistake to give the English sole credit for developing the 
board-centered model of corporate governance that is used around the world.  
Rather, it appears that board-centered corporate governance, even in its early 
175 E.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note __ at 249-254.
176
 Among the ordinances imposed on the members of the Merchant Adventurers was a prohibition 
on marrying women born outside of England.  E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. II, p. 80.
177 Id at 79.  Sometimes, however, these non-London companies of Merchant Adventurers, following 
older patterns of guild governance, elected so-called masters and wardens, instead of governors and assistants.
178 E.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note __ at 255-277.
179
 The fact that the Company of Merchant Adventurers collected admission fees and fines meant 
that there was some need for auditing, but this does not seem to have been a function of the board of assistants.  
E.g., Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some 
Evidence, 26 J. L. & Econ. 613, 620-621 (1983). 
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stages,180 was developing in continental Europe on a roughly parallel track to its 
development in England.
One nice example of the parallel development of corporate boards in 
England and in continental Europe comes from the East India companies.  Two 
years after the formation of the English East India Company, the Dutch 
government chartered the Dutch (or “United”) East India Company.  The charter 
(or octroi) of Dutch East India Company provided for governance by a general 
council of governors (bewindhebbers).181  This council had sixty members, 
broken down into a certain number of representatives from each of the various 
“chambers” which had come together to form the Dutch East India Company.  
These chambers consisted of smaller groups of merchants in Amsterdam (which 
had twenty representatives on the council), Rotterdam and Delft (which had 
fourteen representatives), Hoorn and Enkhuizen (which had fourteen 
representatives), and Zealand (which had twelve representatives).182  These 
merchant groups already had formed shipping companies for trade with the East 
Indies, and, at least at the inception of the Dutch East India Company, actually 
may have conducted the voyages (while the overall Dutch company, much like 
the English regulated companies, served to create a cartel and to present a united 
face when dealing with outsiders).183  Evidently, a sixty-member board turned out 
to be unwieldy, and so the Dutch East India Company established a second 
smaller board (the Collegium) with seventeen members.  This board, too, also 
had a certain number of representatives from each of the chambers – in this case, 
Amsterdam received eight, and Zealand four, and the other four chambers each 
received one.  The seventeenth position rotated.184
Working backwards, the governance structure of some overseas 
communities of Hanseatic merchants displayed a parallel to the board governance 
of the Merchant Adventurers and Merchants of the Staple.  In medieval Europe, 
the term “hanse” referred to associations of traveling merchants frequenting a 
foreign country.  These merchants banded together for protection, to secure 
trading privileges, and to police the trading practices of their fellow merchants.  
While there were hanse of various nationalities (such as a Flemish hanse of 
London), during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, German merchants had 
important hanse in London, Novgorod, Bergen and Bruges.  Cooperation, 
initially on trade issues, between the towns from which these German merchants 
came produced what is known as the Hanseatic League.  In London, the 
Hanseatic merchants had living quarters and worked in a compound bordering 
the Thames, called the Steelyard.  The Steelyard hanse elected an alderman and a 
committee of twelve (one-third elected by the Rhinelanders, one-third elected by 
merchants from Westphalian, Saxon and Wendish towns, and one-third elected 
180
 There are, of course, significant continental European contributions to corporate boards after the 
advent of general incorporation laws in the United States and elsewhere.  These contributions include, most 
notably, the German invention of the two-tier board and co-determination. See notes __ supra.
181 E.g., Schmitthoff, supra note __ at 93-94.
182 E.g., Holden Furber, DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY: RIVAL EMPIRES OF TRADE IN 
THE  ORIENT 1600-1800, 188 (1976).
183 E.g., Schmitthoff, supra note __ at 94.
184 E.g.,Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, Corporate Governance: The Dutch Experience, 16 
Transnat’l Law. 63, 64 (2002).
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by the Prussians and German Balts) to govern the community.  Similarly, an 
alderman and a council governed the German merchants in Bergen.  The 
Hanseatic community in Bruges had a board of six aldermen until 1472; after 
which three aldermen, advised by a committee of twelve, administered the hanse.  
Like the governors (or mayors) and the boards of the Merchant Adventurers and 
Merchants of the Staple, these governing institutions of the Hanseatic merchants 
acted to preserve the group’s trade privileges, to enforce rules of trade, and to 
adjudicate disputes among the merchants.185
It is important to note, however, that innumerable business organizations 
in medieval Europe did not have boards.  While this is obvious for sole 
proprietorships and small partnerships, even some relatively large-scale business 
organizations in continental Europe of the Middle Ages did not have anything 
like a board.  For example, large Italian mercantile and banking companies, such 
as the Peruzzi and Medici companies, lacked a board.  Instead, these were 
partnerships operated under the domination of a family leader or trusted manager.  
The Peruzzi company (which existed from around 1275 to 1343) operated as a 
single partnership with branch operations.  Partners in the company managed the 
major branches (Avignon, Bruges, London, Naples, Palermo and Paris), while 
factors (salaried employees) managed lesser branches.  All partners residing in 
Florence (the company’s home city) had the right to participate in management, 
but, as a practical matter, one partner, who gained the confidence of the others, 
largely ran the business.  For almost a century (from 1397 to 1494) the Medici 
conducted banking and manufacturing operations.  Instead of operating as one 
large partnership, the Medici established the equivalent to a holding company 
arrangement in which separate partnerships conducted operations in various 
locales, while the main partnership in Florence retained majority control over the 
local partnerships.  As the family members became distracted with Florentine 
politics, a principal administrator (called a ministro) provided overall supervision 
from Florence.186  Overall, the development of corporate boards in Continental 
Europe is consistent with the English experience: corporate boards developed as 
a governance mechanism for merchant societies (like the hanse) or merchant 
cartels (like the Dutch East India Company), and only later evolved into the 
governance mechanism for large business ventures with passive investors.
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS OF CORPORATE BOARDS
The previous section of this paper looked at when and how corporate 
governance through elected boards developed and came to the United States.  
This section asks why such a governance scheme originated.  In other words, 
from what sources did the early corporations get the idea of using elected 
governing boards?  What purpose was this governance structure supposed to 
achieve?  Why was this form of governance employed versus other alternatives?
In fact, corporate governance by a representative board, working with a 
chief executive officer (a “governor” in the typical parlance of the early corporate 
185 E.g., R. de Roover, The Organization of Trade, in THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF EUROPE 111-115 (edited by M.M. Postan, E.E. Rich, & Edward Miller, 1963).
186 Id at 76-87.
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charters), is a reflection of political practices and ideas widespread in Western 
Europe in the late middle ages.  Specifically, while fictional literature often 
pictures medieval Europe as a place of autocratic governance by kings,187
European political ideology and practice in the late middle ages, although hardly 
democratic, often called for the use of collective governance by a body of 
representatives.  Examples of such representative governance ideas and practices 
are found in the assemblies or parliaments of medieval European kingdoms, in 
town councils, in governing councils for guilds, and in the Church.  Given this 
prevalent practice, and the ideology that underlay this practice, it was natural for 
the early corporations to utilize board governance. 
A.  Parliamentary Assemblies
1. The Growth of Parliamentary Assemblies
European kingdoms in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries 
widely undertook the development and use of representative assemblies, which 
are precursors of today’s parliaments.188  The English Parliament, because of its 
survival and ultimate influence, is the most noted example.189  The English 
Parliament emerged in the thirteenth century out of several preexisting practices.  
Early English kings, like kings elsewhere in Western Europe during the early 
middle ages, commonly had councils of advisors.190  Power struggles in the 
thirteenth century between the kings and the barons created an impetus toward 
broader assemblies with heads of the clergy and the barons.191  During the final 
third of the thirteenth century, attendance at English parliaments began to expand 
beyond the King’s council, the senior clergy, and the barons, to include 
representatives of counties and towns.192  The summonses issued by Edward I to 
187 E.g., William Shakespeare, RICHARD III.
188 E.g., Thomas N. Bisson, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THEIR ORIGINS 
AND NATURE 1 (1973).
189 See, e.g., William Stubbs, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1878).
190 E.g., Susan Reynolds, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 900-1300 
__ (2d ed. 1997).  Anglo-Saxon kings referred to such a council as a witen or witenagemot (as in “meeting of 
the wise”).  E.g., John Cannon, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO BRITISH HISTORY 994 (1997).
191
 For example, King John's reluctant agreement to Magna Carta in 1215 codified a prohibition on 
"aid" (loosely speaking, taxes), except to ransom the king, knight his eldest son, or marry his eldest daughter, 
unless consented to by "common counsel" (commune consilium) composed of archbishops, bishops, abbots, 
counts, greater barons, and the king's tenants-in-chief, summoned on at least 40 days' notice.  E.g., Magna 
Carta of 1215 reprinted in William Stubbs, SELECT CHARTERS (9th ed. 18__).  In 1258, Henry III agreed 
with the barons to a set of reforms commonly labeled the "Provisions of Oxford."  E.g., H.G. Richardson & 
G.O. Sayles, PARLIAMENTS AND GREAT COUNCILS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1-3 (1961).  These 
provisions mandated holding three "parliaments" per year, at which both the 15 members of the king's council, 
and 12 "honest men" elected by "the commonality" (presumably the barons), would be present.  E.g., Provisions 
of Oxford reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS, supra.
192
  English kings, at least as far back as Richard I, periodically issued summons for one or more 
counties to send representatives to appear before the king's court to discuss particular business.  E.g., Desire 
Pasquet, AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGINS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 223 (1925) (translation by R.G.D. 
Laffan). Beginning in 1265, English kings went beyond such isolated appearances by county representatives, 
and would, at times, summon all counties and towns to send representatives to a parliament.   E.g., Summons to 
the Parliament of 1265 reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS, supra note __ .  (Actually, writers often credit the 
"parliament" assembled by Simon de Montfort during his struggle with the king in 1264 as being the first 
"parliament" in England to include representatives of the towns and counties.  E.g., Michael A.R. Graves, THE 
PARLIAMENTS OF EARLY MODERN EUROPE 18 (19__).)  
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the so-called Model Parliament of 1295 provide a good example.  These 
summonses ordered the sheriffs of the counties to cause to be elected to attend 
the parliament, with full power to do the business of the parliament, two knights 
to represent each county, and two citizens to represent each city and two burghers 
to represent each borough within a county.193  Eventually, the knights and the 
town representatives began to meet together in a chamber separately from the 
barons, thereby establishing what became the House of Commons, while the 
barons meeting together became the House of Lords.194
While the English parliament provides the most noted example of the 
development of parliamentary institutions in Europe of the middle ages, England 
was not the only, or even likely the first, medieval European country to develop a 
parliament.  Instead, many historians credit several Spanish kingdoms, such as 
Leon and Aragon-Catalonia, with establishing the first parliaments, which the 
kingdoms called “Cortes.”195  In the end, however, the unification of Spain did 
not produce a unification of the Cortes, and the power of the Cortes seems to 
have receded following the fifteenth century in the face of the growing authority 
of the Spanish monarchy.196
Aragon-Catalonian Cortes spread into Sicily, Sardinia and southern 
Italy,197 while, elsewhere in Italy, a variety of parliaments and similar assemblies 
came into being, beginning as early as the mid-thirteenth century assemblies 
between nobles, clergy and town representatives convened by the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Frederick II.198  Ultimately, however, the medieval Italian parliaments 
waned in the face the growing authoritarian power of the heads of the city-states, 
so that, by the height of the Renaissance, only three Italian parliaments 
remained.199
In medieval Germany, parliament-like assemblies occurred both on a 
national or imperial level (a Reichstag or diet) and on the level of the 
principalities (a Landtage).200  The extent to which the Reichstag, with a few 
193 Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295 reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS supra
note__.  After 1327, English kings summoned knights and town representatives to every parliament.  E.g., 
Richardson & Sayles, supra note __ at 38.
194 E.g., Pasquet, supra note __ at 22_-230.
195 E.g., Graves supra note __ at 14. For example, in 1188, King Alfonso of Leon summoned 
representatives of the clergy, nobility and towns together into a Cortes at which he agreed not to "make war or 
peace or treaty unless with the counsel of bishops, nobles and good men."  E.g., Royal Engagements to a Cortes 
Including Town Deputies at Leon, reprinted in Bisson, supra note __ at 143.  In the combined kingdom of 
Aragon and Catalonia, Cortes appear to have included representatives of towns as early as 1163 and 1214 (e.g., 
Gaines Post, Roman Law and Early Representation in Spain and Italy, 18 Speculum 211-224 (1943)), which is 
well before this occurred in England.  In 1283, Peter III of Aragon confirmed, if not established, the 
constitutional power of the Aragon-Catalan Cortes, when he summoned together clerics, nobles, and town 
representatives for a Cortes at which he promised annual assemblies and no new laws without the assembly's 
assent.  E.g., Graves supra note __ at 15.
196 E.g., Bruce Lyon, STUDIES OF WEST EUROPEAN MEDIEVAL INSTITUTIONS 176 (___).   
But see Jean Nicolas, Julio Valdeon & Sergij Vilfan, The Monarchic State and Resistance 73-74 in 
RESISTANCE, REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY (Peter Blickle, ed., 1997) (recent historians have 
challenged the traditional view that the Cortes declined as a consequence of the increasing power of the Spanish 
monarchs).
197 E.g., Graves supra note __ at 16.
198 E.g., Lyon, supra note __ at 168-69.
199 E.g., H.G. Koenigsberger, The Parliament of Piedmont during the Renaissance, 1460-1560, 11 
Etudes 69, 70 (1952).
200 E.g, Lyon, supra note __ at 166.
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historic exceptions, constituted a real parliament is in doubt, however, not 
because of too much sovereign control, but, ironically, because of too little.  As 
the Holy Roman Emperor became increasingly powerless, control shifted to the 
local princes and towns acting individually rather then through the Reichstag.201
Hence, the Landtage, which were assemblies of local nobles and town 
representatives in a principality, constituted the more significant representative 
assemblies in medieval Germany.  These assemblies frequently played a role of 
arbitrator in resolving dynastic disputes involving either succession to the throne 
or partition of territory, and often used the occasion to extract concessions, such 
as control over taxes.202
French assemblies with participants from the nobility, the clergy and the 
towns became known as the Estates, as they included representatives of the three 
estates (or classes) which, under the view of the time, comprised medieval 
society.203  As with medieval Germany, medieval France had both national 
assemblies, the Estates General,204 and local assemblies, the provincial Estates, 
and, like Germany, the local assemblies became the more important.  In France, 
however, this phenomenon stemmed from the growing power of the monarchy 
over the local lords, rather than visa versa.  French kings (perhaps fearing the 
example set by the growing power of the English parliaments) by and large 
declined to call for Estates General, and, instead, sought consent to increased aid 
from the provincial Estates.205  At the same time, French nobles did not combine 
to force the king to call national assemblies, as had the English barons.206  As a 
result, Estates in provinces negotiated over and consented to taxes, and played 
what turned into an ever-decreasing role as a constitutional check on the growing 
power of the French monarchy.207
2. Parliamentary Assemblies and Corporate Boards
To what extent did these medieval assemblies and parliaments inspire, or 
201 Id at 166-167
202
 In the late fourteenth century, a strong Lantage emerged in the principalities of Hesse, Bavaria, 
Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bohemia.  E.g., Graves supra note __ at 23-24.
203 E.g., Joseph Billioud, LES ETATS DE BOURGOGNE AUX XIVe ET XVe SIECLES 328-329 
(1922).   Interestingly, France also had institutions labeled a "parlement," but these institutions were composed 
of magistrates and their function was judicial.  E.g., Nicolas, Valdeon & Vilfan, supra note __ at 78-80.
204
  Historians generally consider the Estates General to begin with the assembly convened in Paris in 
1302 by the French king, Phillip the Fair, who was seeking support in his dispute with the Pope.  In order to 
obtain the necessary revenues, Phillip went beyond the traditional assembly of lords who owed a direct feudal 
obligation to the king, and also summoned representatives of villas (towns) to appear with the full power to 
consent to grant aid.  E.g., Charles H. McIlawin, Medieval Estates, 7 The Cambridge Medieval History 683-687 
(1932). 
205 E.g., Robert Fawtier, Parlement d'Angleterre et Etats Generaux de France au Moyen Age, in 
COMPES-RENDUS DE L'ACADEMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS ET BELLES-LETTRES 276-284 (1953).
206 E.g., Lyon, supra note __ at 173-175.
207 E.g., Gustave Dupont-Ferrier, De Quelques Problemes Historiques Relatifs aux Etats 
Provinciaux, J. des Savants 315 (Aug.-Oct. 1928).  There were a variety of assemblies and parliaments in 
medieval European kingdoms beyond those in England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France.  E.g., Graves, supra
note __ at 14-25.  One of these, that in Brabrant (what is now part of Belium), bears special mention.  In a series 
of charters, culminating in the so-called Joyeuse Entree (often referred to as the Belgium Magna Carta), the 
dukes of Brabrant (who were in serious financial trouble) granted to a council composed of nobles and 
representatives of wealthy towns, control over war, alliances, ducal appointments, legislation and taxes.  E.g., 
Lyon, supra note __ at 179-180.
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else reflect common thinking with, the earliest corporate boards?  One difficulty 
with answering this question arises from the fact that historians have engaged in 
seemingly endless interpretation, revised thinking and debate as to the nature, 
origins and impact of these medieval assemblies and parliaments.208  For 
example, while a pioneering historian in the field, William Stubbs, argued that 
the essential elements of a parliament, as recognized in late thirteenth century 
England, were: (1) the existence of a central or national assembly; (2) that 
included representatives of all classes of people (nobility and commons); (3) the 
classes being present or having freely elected their representatives; and (4) which 
possessed powers of taxation, legislation and general political deliberation,209 the 
legal historian, Frederic Maitland, argued that the core of a parliament, as 
understood in the thirteenth century, was a session of the king's council, and that 
much of the business of a parliament was judicial (hearing petitions and resolving 
grievances and the like).210
Historians have propounded various theories as to why parliaments 
developed in Europe in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries.  Some 
suggest that such assemblies were a natural outgrowth of medieval ideas 
concerning the need for consultation and consensus decision-making, which held 
that both custom and common law required the king to consult with, and obtain 
the acquiescence of, the broader community when making decisions.211   Other 
historians emphasize the Roman and Canon Law doctrines of quod omnes tangit 
ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all"), and plena 
potestas (the "full power" of a representative to bind a corporate body to 
decisions) as providing the legal basis for the development of medieval 
parliaments.212  Many historians see fiscal needs providing a critical impetus for 
the development of parliaments, as growing demands for revenue increasingly 
forced kings to seek consent from assemblies for taxes.213  Yet other historians 
argue that parliaments may have been an outgrowth of military assemblies in 
which the king sought counsel regarding, and support for, decisions regarding 
war.214  The traditional history of the English parliament, as recited earlier, 
emphasizes the demands of nobility for consultation as providing an impetus for 
the development of parliaments; but other historians argue that parliaments were 
a burden imposed by the kings, much like typical attitudes toward a present-day 
summons for jury duty.215  A theory often associated with German historians 
208
 For a good overview of the principal streams of thought involved in these interpretations, 
revisions and debates, see Bisson, supra note __ at 1-5.
209
 Stubbs, supra note __ at __.
210
 Frederic W. Maitland, RECORDS OF THE PARLIAMENT HOLDEN AT WESTMINSTER __ 
(___).  Historians writing more recently have continued this debate.  Compare Richardson & Sayles, supra note 
__ at __ (function of thirteenth century English parliaments was essentially judicial), with Bertie Wilkinson, 
STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH 
CENTURIES 14-29, 50-54 (2d ed. 1952) (function of medieval English parliaments was essentially to make 
political decisions).
211 E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 302-305.  This custom and common law may, in turn, have been 
a product of a fusion between Germanic tribal traditions and Christian ideas regarding community.  Id at __.
212 E.g., Brian Tierney, Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, 52 Catholic Historical 
Rev. 1 (1966).
213 E.g., John B. Morrall, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL TIMES 60 (___).
214 E.g., Thomas N. Bisson, The Military Origins of Medieval Representation, 71 Am. Historical 
Rev. 1199 (1966).
215 E.g., Pasquet, supra note __ at 22_.
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views medieval parliaments as an outgrowth of medieval corporatism -- not in 
the sense of business corporations, but in the sense that medieval society was 
organized into various collectives or corporate groups (churches, guilds, towns, 
etc.), each one of which possessed various rights and privileges.  Under this 
theory, medieval parliaments developed as a compromise through which the king 
dealt with the representatives of the more powerful corporate groups in society.216
Of course, many of these theories as to the nature, origins and impact of medieval 
European parliaments are not mutually inconsistent, but rather, much like the 
blind persons' descriptions of the elephant, are simply emphasizing different 
aspects of a multi-faceted phenomenon.
Needless to say, there is not the space here to explore all of the varying 
theories and debates about medieval European parliaments.  Instead, what is 
important for purposes of this paper is the extent to which the use of boards in 
early business corporations resulted from imitating medieval European 
parliaments, or, more likely, whether the underlying ideas that produced 
medieval European parliaments also promoted the use of boards in early business 
corporations.  In the absence of direct evidence of linkage, we must examine the 
similarities and differences in practices and concepts between the two 
institutions.  At first glance, there is an obvious similarity between early 
corporate boards and medieval parliaments in that both seemingly involve 
collective decision-making by a representative group.  Yet, on closer scrutiny, it 
is not simple to say whether medieval parliaments embodied all, or even most, of 
the underlying concepts discussed earlier in this paper217 which define the board-
centered model of corporate governance; i.e. decision-making by a group of 
peers, elected to represent (rather than themselves constituting all of) the owners, 
and who have the ultimate authority over the executive officers.  
To begin with, the mere assembly of nobles, clergy and town 
representatives with the king did not mean that there was collective or peer group 
decision-making in the medieval "parliaments."  After all, even the most 
autocratic medieval monarch might wish to call an assembly of nobles, clergy 
and perhaps town representatives in order to announce decisions or as an 
audience for major events in the kingdom (coronations or the like).  Alternately, 
monarchs with absolute authority might seek advice from, and the support of, a 
council or a broader assembly, but nevertheless retain power to make the ultimate 
decision.  Nevertheless, while many medieval assemblies -- even ones to which a 
medieval chronicler might attach the label "parliament" or an equivalent term --
216 E.g., Emile Lousse, Parlementarisme ou corporatisme? Les origines des assemblees d'etats, 4 
Revue Historique de Droit Francais et Etranger 684-706 (1935). Just as there are different theories for the 
origins of medieval parliaments, there are also different explanations as to why the English parliament survived 
when other medieval European parliaments withered.  While some nineteenth century historians attributed the 
survival of the English parliament to innate characteristics of the English people (e.g., Stubbs, supra note __ at 
1-11), more recent historians find the explanation in a balance of power between the English kings, nobles, and 
towns, which prevented the withering of parliaments at the hands of absolute monarchs (as later occurred in 
France and Spain) on the one hand, or the fracturing of parliaments as a result of conflicts between overly 
powerful local lords and towns (as occurred in Germany and Italy) on the other hand. E.g., Lyon, supra note __ 
at 157-183.  Geography that was not too large (as in France), or too small (as in various city states), also may 
have given the English parliament a "Goldilocks" like survival advantage.  E.g., Robert Fawtier, Parlement 
d'Angleterre et Etats Generaux de France au Moyen Age, in COMPES-RENDUS DE L'ACADEMIE DES 
INSCRIPTIONS ET BELLES-LETTRES 276-284 (1953).
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no doubt fit within these two possibilities, many medieval parliaments did entail 
real collective or peer group decision-making.218  For example, it would not seem 
to have made much sense for the English barons to press the king to agree in 
Magna Carta to obtain consent of "common counsel" to "aid," (taxes) or to agree 
in the Provisions of Oxford to hold three parliaments per year,219 if such 
assemblies could only give non-binding advise to the king, but otherwise must 
approve or carry out the king's decisions.  Other assemblies for which there 
seems to be good evidence of real decision-making power include the council of 
nobles and town representatives in Brabant (now part of Belgium), which had 
control over war, alliances, ducal appointments, legislation and taxes, the 
Aragon-Catalan Cortes, which had a veto over new laws, and the Landtage of 
some of the German principalities.220  Beyond the evidence of specific practice, 
the Roman or Canon Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur
(what touches all is to be approved by all) would not seem to be met by a 
parliament that had no choice about consenting to the king's decisions.221
Whether the concept of representation embodied in the board-centered 
model of corporate governance (that shareholders elect a group of directors, 
rather than manage the firm themselves) is anything like the "representative" 
nature of medieval parliaments is an even more complex question.  The 
complexity arises from the different meanings encapsulated within the overall 
idea of representation.  At its simplest level, both corporate boards and medieval 
parliaments are "representative" in the sense that a smaller group makes decisions 
binding upon a larger group, instead of having the entire body of shareholders (in 
the corporation), or the entire body politic (in the kingdom) make decisions.  
Indeed, many historians attach great significance to the Roman or Canon Law 
doctrine of plena potestas  (the full power of a representative to bind a corporate 
body to decisions) in turning feudal assemblies into parliaments.  It was through 
this doctrine that representatives of the towns bound the towns to the decisions 
(particularly regarding taxes) of the parliaments, rather than the king having to 
negotiate tax collection or the like with each town.222  On the other hand, the 
concept of representation seemingly embodied in plena potestas, as well as 
encompassed within the corporatist view of medieval society, was that 
individuals represented particular groups -- for example, the burgher represented 
the particular town that sent him -- rather than the whole kingdom.223  This is 
218 E.g., Antonio Marongiu, MEDIEVAL PARLIAMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 45-67 
(1968)
219
  See note __ supra. 
220
  See notes __ supra.
221 But see Morrall, supra note __ at 65.  The fact that many medieval parliaments exercised real 
collective decision making authority does not necessarily mean that they operated through formal votes and 
majority rule, as would a modern legislature.  Instead, medieval political philosophy typically placed a high 
value on consensus based decisions.  E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 319.  Still, this fact might not distinguish 
medieval political thought from current board-centered corporate governance, since corporate boards also 
typically operate, in practice if not in law, through consensus based decisions.  E.g., Manning, supra, note __ at 
__.  In any event, as remains true both in legislatures and corporate boards today, the theoretical right to refuse 
consent does not mean that, as a matter of practical politics, a board or legislative body will say no to a strong or 
popular chief executive. 
222 E.g., Morrall, supra note __ at 64-65.
223 E.g, Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, supra note __ (summons states that the 
knights sent to parliament are to have "full and sufficient power for themselves and the community of aforesaid 
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different from the representative capacity of the board members of the early 
English business corporations, who typically did not represent any particular 
group of owners.224  In fact, this difference in the nature of representation 
between legislatures (in which members represent particular states or districts) 
and corporate boards (at least in the absence of articles creating classified boards) 
carries through to the present time.225  Yet another interpretation within the 
concept of representation stems from the fact that the modern mind tends to 
equate "representation" with democratic election, and, both today, and in the 
early business corporations, shareholders generally have elected members of the 
board.226  By contrast, despite the romantic views of earlier historians like 
Stubbs, town citizens may not have been elected, in any democratic sense, their 
representatives to medieval parliaments.227  Indeed, there may have been little 
demand for democratic elections at a time when people naturally assumed that 
older, wealthier and more powerful members of the community should speak for 
the community,228 and when acting as a representative to parliament was a 
significant unpaid burden.229  Gradually, more and more residents of the counties 
and towns gained the right to vote in the election of representatives to the English 
Commons; yet it was to be centuries before such elections typically involved any 
choice between competing candidates.230  On the other hand, the lack of 
competing candidates remains typical of corporate board elections today.231
The most striking difference between medieval parliaments and 
corporate boards, however, may go to relations with the chief executive.  While 
the corporate board of directors is at least theoretically supreme over the chief 
executive, the question of parliaments' supremacy versus the kings' arose in 
centuries of European disputes232 (of which the English Civil War constitutes one 
shire," and the citizens and burghers sent to parliament  are to have such power "for themselves and the 
community of cities and boroughs separately," to do the business of parliament.  Emphasis added.).
224
 Actually, this seems to have been more true in English versus continental European corporations, 
as witnessed by a comparison of the English East India Company (which, for most of its history, seems to have 
had a board elected at large by all voting members) with the Dutch East India Company -- whose board 
consisted of a defined number of representatives for each of the various "chambers" (merchant groups in 
different Dutch cities) which made up the company.  See text accompanying notes ___ supra.  It is also worth 
noting that the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers called for the election of persons of 
"divers [sic] fellowships."  See text accompanying note __ supra.  This may suggest an intent that the board 
members, even if elected at large, should come from, and thereby represent, different factions or groups within 
the Merchant Adventurers. 
225
 There is some difference in this regard, however, between Anglo-American corporations, and 
those German and other continental European corporations that operate under a system of co-determination in 
which the supervisory board has representatives of the shareholders and representatives of labor.  See note __ 
supra.
226
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.  Boards of early corporations, however, provide some 
noteworthy exceptions to shareholder election of directors.  As discussed earlier, the initial charter of the 
London and the Plymouth Companies empowered the king to name the members of the governing council, 
while "assistants" on the governing board of the Eastland Company retained their positions on good behavior.  
See text accompanying notes ___ and ___ , supra.
227 E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 310.
228 Id at li, 251.
229 E.g., Pasquet, supra note __ at __.
230 E.g, Nicolas, Valdeon & Vilfan, supra note __ at 120-121 (describing growth of the franchise, but 
the lack of choice between candidates, in elections to the English Commons from the fifteenth through 
seventeenth centuries).
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 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
232 E.g., Otto Gierke, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 30-48 (Frederick William 
Maitland translator 1900).
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dramatic example).  Indeed, the relationship of medieval monarch with 
parliament (or the equivalent assembly) provided the most visible, but by no 
means the only, example of an underlying tension running throughout medieval 
political thinking -- this being how to resolve the value medieval society placed 
on hierarchy and respect for authority with the value it placed on collective 
decision-making.233  Hence, even if a medieval parliament had real collective 
decision-making, as opposed to solely advisory, power (for instance to refuse a 
request for aid or taxes), this does not mean that such a parliament had the same 
ultimate power presently entailed in the board-centered model of corporate 
governance.  Most especially, there would appear to be a major difference 
between the power of the corporate board to select and remove the chief 
executive, and the medieval parliaments' general lack of power to do the same 
with the king.234  Still, this difference may be less dramatic than one initially 
might assume.  As discussed earlier,235 the boards in the early corporations 
typically lacked the power to select or remove the corporation's governor (whom 
typically the members directly elected).  Moreover, medieval assemblies 
apparently had a say in selecting the king on a number of instances.236  For 
example, some historians claim that Anglo-Saxon kings required the consent of 
the witan (council of advisors) to choose a successor,237 and, as stated earlier, 
German parliaments arbitrated succession disputes between competing claimants 
to the throne.
All in all, even though there are important differences between corporate 
boards and medieval parliaments, there are enough similarities to suggest a 
common conceptual heritage based upon ideas of collective decision-making by 
representatives of a broader community.  This is well illustrated by the 
invocation of the Roman or Canon law doctrines of quod omnes tangit ab 
omnibus approbetur (what touches all is to be approved by all) and plena 
potestas (the full power of a representative to bind a corporate body) as the legal 
basis for medieval European parliaments.  Significantly, these two Roman or 
Canon law doctrines were by no means solely, or even particularly, applicable to 
parliaments and kingdoms.  Rather, they originated in very different contexts.  
Medieval Canon law jurists and scholars originally developed the doctrine of 
quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur from a Roman law technical rule 
involving co-tutorship into a rationale for allowing lay representatives to attend 
General Councils of the Church,238 while plena potestas originally involved the 
power of agents to represent corporations in civil suits.239  The transposition of 
these two doctrines into a legal basis for medieval parliaments then occurred 
when summonses for attendance at medieval parliaments (which lawyers trained 
in Canon law probably drafted) started invoking the two principles in describing 
233 E.g., Reynolds, supra note__ at xlvvii.
234 E.g., Marcia L. Colish, MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL 
TRADITION 400-1400 348-349 (19__) But see Gierke, supra note __ at 45-46 (discussing medieval jurists' 
claims that representative assemblies might remove a sovereign who neglected his duties).
235
 See text accompanying notes __ supra. 
236 E.g., Gierke, supra note __ at 42. 
237 E.g., Simon Schama, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN 80 (2000).
238 E.g., Tierney, supra note __ at __.
239 E.g., Post, supra note __ at 211.
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the purpose and nature of the representation commanded.240  Yet, there is no 
reason to suppose that doctrines so conveniently transposed into a legal basis for 
representative parliaments might not also serve, even without express 
restatement, the same function for the boards of early business corporations.  
Indeed, the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers grants the 
board "full power and authority" to rule and govern over the merchants.241  This 
suggests a common legal basis for corporate boards and medieval parliaments, 
since both institutions served as vehicles to obtain the consent required by the 
doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur through representatives 
with full power (plena potestas) to give the consent on behalf of the broader 
community.  
It is also worth keeping in mind that some of the apparent differences 
between medieval parliaments and corporate boards may wane when one 
compares medieval parliaments to boards in the early, rather than in today's, 
corporations.  For example, while the judicial function of medieval parliaments 
(for whom, as mentioned above, a significant, if not primary, task was resolving 
legal disputes) seems very different from the role of a modern corporate board, 
much of the function of the board of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was, 
as discussed earlier,242 to resolve mercantile disputes involving members of the 
company.
B.  Town Councils
Town councils constitute a second example of medieval European 
collective decision-making by representative bodies, and, indeed, provide an 
example that is highly relevant in searching for the conceptual origins of the 
corporate board of directors.  There is stronger evidence that the use of governing 
boards in the early corporations was either an imitation of town councils, or at 
least based upon a common intellectual foundation, than is available to establish 
such linkage with medieval parliaments.  Moreover, since the creation of 
medieval European town councils often constituted a departure from either a 
hierarchical governance of the municipality solely by executive officials, at one 
extreme, or a sort of direct democratic governance under which all enfranchised 
members of the community participated, at the other extreme, understanding the 
motivations behind the use of town councils might provide insight into why the 
early corporations chose to employ a board structure, rather than leaving a chief 
executive in charge or following the partnership style system of all owners 
managing the company.
1. The Growth of Town Councils
Across Western Europe during the middle ages, representative town 
240 E.g., Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, supra note __ (reciting the doctrine that 
"what touches all is to be approved by all" in setting forth the purpose of the summons, and commanding that 
the county and town representatives have "full power" to do the business of the parliament).
241
 See note __ supra.
242
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
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councils became a common feature of municipal governance.243  As with 
medieval parliaments, the English experience provides a noted example.  The 
first documented municipal council in medieval English history is found in 
Ipswich in the year 1200.244  On May 25, 1200, King John granted a charter to 
Ipswich.245  The Ipswich charter empowered the town to elect two bailiffs and 
four coroners, who then became the executive officials of the town.246  For our 
purposes, however, what is most important is something that was not in the 
charter.  According to a chronicle apparently made by the town clerk,247 on June 
29, 1200, an assembly of the town occurred in the churchyard of St. Mary’s 
Tower in order to carry out the election of the bailiffs and coroners as 
commanded by the charter.  After completing this election, the gathered 
townsfolk then decided that “henceforth there should be in the said borough 
twelve sworn chief portmen,248 as there are in other free boroughs of England, 
and that they should have full power, for themselves and for the whole town, to 
govern and maintain the said borough and all its liberties, to render judgments of 
the town and also to keep, ordain, and do in the said borough whatever should be 
done for the well-being and honor of the said town.”249
While we only have the word of the burgesses of Ipswich for the 
assertion that town councils were already the norm among free boroughs of 
England in 1200, it was not long before other documented examples of English 
town councils appeared.250  The evidence shows that among English free 
boroughs after the twelfth century, a town council of twelve or twenty-four
members was the norm.251
243 E.g., Fritz Rorig, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 26 (1967).
244 E.g., Heather Swanson, MEDIEVAL BRITISH TOWNS 80 (1999).  This is not to suggest that 
Ipswich was a particularly important or innovative burg, even in medieval times.  Rather, Ipswich’s prime place 
in the history of English municipal government is the result of its good fortune in making a chronicle of the 
relevant events and in having that record survive the subsequent centuries.
245 E.g., Carl Stephenson, BOROUGH AND TOWN: A STUDY OF URBAN ORIGINS IN 
ENGLAND 174 (19__).  In large part, the Ipswich charter is a fairly typical example of the charters granted by 
John and other kings to boroughs in the middle ages.  Indeed, a charter granted earlier the same year to 
Northampton apparently served as the model for the Ipswich charter, as well as for the charters granted to 
Gloucester, Lincoln and Shrewsbury.  Id .  The Ipswich charter granted the burgesses of the town a “fee farm,” 
in other words, the right to collect their own taxes and remit to the king his share, as opposed to having a royal 
appointee (a “reeve”) collect the taxes (and presumably keep a bit for himself).  The charter also granted certain 
other rights and privileges that had the effect of removing the burgesses of Ipswich from feudal status, such as 
exemptions from tolls, and the right to try disputes in their own courts rather than in the court of the local noble.  
E.g., Colin Platt, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWN 130 (1976).
246
 The bailiffs had the function of the former reeve, while the coroners, who had broader duties than 
entailed in our current notion of the office, handled judicial and various other matters pertaining to the crown, 
and were also responsible for supervising the bailiffs.  E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 175.
247
 There has been some argument about the authenticity of this chronicle as being, in fact, a 
contemporary account, as opposed to a later interpolation.  Id at 177 (discussing the basis for the challenge and 
rejecting the argument).
248
 The word “port” at this time could be used synonymously with borough, so that, for example, the 
borough court was often referred to as the “portmanmoot.”  E.g., Swanson, supra note __ at 75.
249 E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 175 (translating from the original Latin).  
250
 For example, records reflect the election in 1206 of a council of twenty-four for London.  E.g., 
Platt, supra note __ at 132.
251 E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 174 n. 4.  Later, as municipal governance in England evolved 
into the sixteenth century, a bicameral council system replaced the single council in many English cities.  This 
commonly entailed an inner council of twelve or twenty-four members (that was often self-perpetuating, rather 
than elected), and an elected outer council of some greater number (often a multiple of twelve).  E.g., Peter 
Clark & Paul Slack, ENGLISH TOWNS IN TRANSITION 1500-1700 29, 128-129 (1976).
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Just as the case with medieval parliaments, England was not the first 
medieval European country to have widespread town councils.  Rather, 
documents show increasing use of such councils already occurring in other 
medieval European countries during the century before the events at Ipswich.  
Not surprisingly in view of their rapid growth, Italian medieval cities provide 
some of the earliest evidence of the use of town councils.252  In the twelfth 
century, groups composed of so-called “consuls” -- typically numbering from 
four to twelve, or a multiple thereof253-- governed many Italian cities.254  Because 
of continued strife between various classes and factions, however, Italian cities, 
after a period of increasingly democratic governance during the thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries, often ended up in the Renaissance governed by 
magistrates and princes with dictatorial powers.255
In the north, municipalities in Flanders also provide very early evidence 
of the use of town councils; albeit, this apparent precociousness may simply 
reflect an accident of greater documentation.  A succession dispute in 1127 over 
who would become the count of Flanders has left for later historians a written 
charter granted to Saint-Omer, the provisions in which might be typical of the 
rights of towns in Flanders at the time.  In addition to confirming the burgesses of 
the town’s exemptions from obligations of feudalism, the Saint-Omer charter, 
significantly for our purposes, grants the burgesses the right to be tried by their 
own “echevins.”256  While this suggests solely a judicial function for the so-
called “echevins,” it appears from later evidence that during the twelfth century 
in Flanders the echevins had become a locally elected commission, normally 
numbering twelve persons, who handled all of the executive, as well as judicial, 
governance functions of the town.257  Such councils with combined judicial and 
executive functions -- sometimes called echevins and sometimes called “jures” --
can be found governing towns throughout northern France by the middle to late 
twelfth century, while in the south of France, similar institutions, but whose 
252
  There are suggestions of the existence of some sort of town council in Pisa by 1081, when the 
Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, issued a charter to Pisa, promising various liberties, and agreeing not to 
appoint any marquis in Tuscany unless twelve representatives of Pisa gave their consent in an assembly 
summoned by the town bells; albeit it is unclear whether these twelve persons were a permanent council. E.g., 
Reynolds, supra note __ at 169.
253 E.g., John H. Mundy & Peter Riesenberg, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 50 (1958).
254 E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 169-170. At first, the local bishop or viscount (who represented 
the Holy Roman emperor) appointed these consuls (e.g., Summerfield Baldwin, BUSINESS IN THE MIDDLE 
AGES 52 (19__); but eventually they became either self-perpetuating or else elected by a body of the leading 
citizens of the city. E.g., Rorig, supra note __ at 26.  For example, in Florence during the twelfth century, the 
assembly which elected the consuls was known as the “parlamentum.”  E.g., R.W. Carstens, THE MEDIEVAL 
ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 18 (19__).  As the Italian cities developed and internal 
dissension grew, their municipal governments evolved.  Whereas the consuls seemed to have performed 
representative, executive and judicial functions (e.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 170), the new municipal 
constitutions often reposed the executive function in a single office, the “podesta,” (e.g., James W. Thompson, 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES (300-1300) 784 (19__), while the 
representative function might lie with a combination of a twelve or twenty-four member lesser council, and 
broader assemblies.  E.g., Anthony Black, GUILDS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT FROM THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 48 (1984).  These constitutions also 
sometimes adopted fairly elaborate schemes for selecting members of the councils.  E.g., Mundy and 
Riesenberg, supra note __ at 79-80.  
255 Id at 79, 82-83.
256 E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 34-35.
257 Id at 37.
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members possessed the Italian influenced name of consuls, were in charge of the 
foremost towns by 1150.258  In the end, however, just as the growing autocratic 
control by town princes doomed most Italian parliaments and town councils 
alike, the growing power of the French monarchy caused a decline in the power 
of both the Estates and the French town councils.  By the middle of the fifteenth 
century, royal officials were taking over control from the consular government of 
the town burgesses in France.259
During the twelfth and thirteen centuries, the town council continued to 
spread throughout Western Europe.260  The end result was that town councils, 
commonly numbering twelve or some multiple thereof, became a prevalent 
feature of medieval European municipal government.261
2. Town Councils and Corporate Boards
The earlier comparison of medieval European parliaments and corporate 
boards produced some, but admittedly only mixed, evidence of imitation or a 
common conceptual underpinning.  By contrast, there is much stronger evidence 
of such commonality between early corporate boards and medieval European 
town councils.  To begin with, medieval municipalities were often “corporations” 
themselves, and, hence, would have provided a logical template for governance 
provisions in the charters of the early trading companies.  Actually, medieval 
towns were corporations under a couple of different meanings of the term – both 
of which, in fact, are significant in suggesting a linkage between town councils 
and the early trading company boards.  
The definition of a “corporation” that is more familiar to the lawyer is 
that it is a fictitious legal entity or person, created by an act of the state, which 
possesses rights such as the ability to hold property and to sue and be sued, and 
can continue to exist despite the death of its members.262   Many English towns, 
starting in the fifteenth century, sought and received charters making them 
corporations in this sense.263  The typical explanation for this action given by 
historians focuses on certain practical advantages that resulted from such status –
especially, the ability of a town to avoid application of the legislation on 
mortmain by becoming a royally chartered corporation empowered to hold 
property.264  The same concerns with owning property despite the legislation on 
mortmain also inspired a number of English guilds to seek royal grants of 
corporate charters at this time.265  Hence, it is entirely plausible that lawyers 
258 Id at 40-41.  There were eight consuls in the governing group for Avignon, twelve in Marseilles, 
and twenty-four in Toulouse.  E.g., Thompson, supra. note __ at 784.
259 E.g., R.H. Hilton, ENGLISH AND FRENCH TOWNS IN FEUDAL SOCIETY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 51(1992).
260
  For example, presumably copying from Italy and France, members of German town councils 
during the thirteenth century began to refer to themselves as consuls.  E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 174.
261 Id at 191.
262 E.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
263 E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 142.
264 Id at 143-144.  The fact that the rapid growth in corporate charters for English towns began after 
the extension, in 1391, of mortmain legislation to reach towns and guilds supports this explanation.
265 E.g., Susan Reynolds, IDEAS AND SOLIDARITIES OF MEDIEVAL LAITY ch. VI, pp. 12-13 
(1995).
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drafting charters for towns, guilds, and, later, trading companies, would have 
borrowed ideas, including with respect to governance, from the charter of one 
type of corporation in order to include in the charter of another type --
particularly insofar as one aspect of the trend toward formal town incorporation 
was the inclusion in the new charters of governance provisions formalizing and 
refining the reliance on town councils.266
There is another meaning of corporation, however, which would have 
encompassed more towns, at an earlier stage, and could have had an even more 
profound linkage to the governance of early trading companies.  This meaning 
comes from a sort of realist theory of the corporation often associated with 
German legal philosophers.267  Under this approach, a corporation is not some 
fictitious legal person created by an act of the state, but rather the law’s 
recognition that some groups can engage in such a degree of collective action and 
have such a collective identity that the collective itself starts to exist as an 
independent reality, and, as such, possesses rights and liabilities.  Medieval 
corporations in this sense included guilds, universities, the Church or some of its 
components, and, of importance here, towns.268  We encountered this notion 
before as one explanation of the development of medieval parliaments –
specifically, that such parliaments arose as a mechanism through which 
representatives of the more powerful corporations dealt with the monarch.269
While this consequence of the corporate nature of medieval society impacted 
political institutions external to the corporations themselves, the corporate nature 
of medieval society could also have had an impact on the nature of political or 
governing institutions within the corporations.  This internal impact, which, if 
present, would establish an extraordinarily strong link between town councils and 
corporate boards, arises from the possibility that the widespread existence of 
corporate collectives in medieval Europe produced overarching ideas about the 
governance of corporate collectives, no matter in what context the collective 
arose – town, guild, or trading company – and that these overarching ideas 
naturally led to the introduction of councils and boards.270  We shall return to the 
prospect shortly when considering why medieval European towns developed 
councils.
In addition to providing a logical source for governance ideas for the 
early trading corporations, medieval town councils had a practical linkage to such 
corporations.  This linkage comes through the merchant guilds. As discussed 
above,271 the early trading companies (as exemplified by the Company of 
266 E.g., Id at ch. XIII pp. 49-50 (giving the example of Gloucester, which adopted a charter 
following the “London model” of a mayor, a council of aldermen, and a broader common council); Clark & 
Slack, supra note __ at 128 (asserting the new charters were designed to promote control by the oligarchy).
267 E.g., Frederic W. Maitland, Translator's Introduction to Otto Gierke, POLITICAL THEORIES 
OF THE MIDDLE AGE xxv-xxvii (1900).
268 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 24. 
269
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
270
 One example of this transposition of governance ideas between types of corporations so as to 
create an overarching ideology of corporate (in the broadest sense of the word) governance, is found in the 
works of the medieval jurist, Bartolus.  Dealing with the issue of whether consent for action by a city required 
an assembly of the populace, Bartolus applied the earlier work of the medieval scholar of canon law, Hostiensis, 
who wrote that the consent required of the members of ecclesiastical colleges could only be given in a public 
assembly.  E.g., Black, supra note __ at 84. 
271
 See text accompanying notes ___ supra.
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Merchant Adventurers) were in large measure little more than merchant guilds, 
which then morphed into the joint stock companies.  Guild leadership, in turn, 
substantially overlapped with membership on medieval town councils.  Once 
again, we can thank the Ipswich chronicler for convenient evidence of this 
relationship.  The Ipswich charter, like many similar charters, granted the 
burgesses the right to have a guild merchant.272  The Ipswich chronicler relates 
how, during the course of their organizing assemblies, the Ipswich townsfolk 
selected one of the twelve chief portmen to be the alderman (or head) of this 
guild, and named three other chief portmen, as well as one of the coroners, to be 
the four assistants to the alderman.273  In many instances, the overlap between 
town council and the leadership of the merchant guild went beyond common 
members.  In Cologne, the managing committee of the merchant guild became 
the town’s first government,274 while, in Calais, the governing council of the 
Merchants of the Staple ran the town for two years.275  Florentine town councils 
for some time were composed of representatives selected by the various guilds.276
In many towns, the guildhall served as, and ultimately became, the town hall.277
All told, given the connections between town councils and merchant guilds, and 
between merchant guilds and early trading companies, it is difficult to believe 
that similarities between town councils and early corporate boards are 
coincidental.
Additional evidence that early corporate boards were either imitating 
medieval town councils, or were based upon ideas held in common, comes from 
the comparing the composition of the two bodies.  To begin with, one strikingly 
common feature of the medieval town councils, themselves, is the tendency of 
such councils to contain twelve, twenty-four, or some other multiple or fraction 
of twelve, members. This is not a coincidence.  Instead, it appears to derive from 
the twelve-person princely court of Charlemagne and his successors – with its six 
“scabini” or judgment-finders, four judges who read the law, and two advocates 
who protected the church.278  Significantly, twelve, twenty-four, or some multiple 
or fraction of twelve, also turns out to be a common number of board members in 
the earliest corporations.279  The council of the Company of the Merchants of the 
272 E.g., Hilton, supra note __ at 93.  Along similar lines, the 1127 charter for Saint-Omer contains 
various provisions supporting the town’s guild.  E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 35.  The charter granted to 
Gloucester in the same year as Ipswich’s provides an interesting variation.  Instead of granting the various 
liberties to the town’s burgesses, who are then empowered to have a guild merchant, the Gloucester charter, for 
the most part, simply granted the liberties associated with a borough franchise to the “burgesses of Gloucester 
of the gild merchant;” i.e. to the members of the guild.  E.g., Hilton, supra note __ at 93.
273 Id.  Even more dramatically, a comparison of a mid-thirteenth century membership list of the 
Leicester town council, with the membership list at the same time of the governing council of Leicester’s 
merchant guild (both with twenty-four members), shows that they were composed of virtually the same persons.  
Platt, supra note __ at 133.  During the sixteenth century, many of the English municipal leaders were closely 
identified with the Merchant Adventurers (Clark & Slack, supra note __ at 129), whose charter, as discussed 
above, helped establish the use of a board among English trading companies.  
274 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 56.
275
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
276 E.g., Carstens, supra note __ at 18-22
277 E.g., H.C.W. Davis, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 310 (1924).
278 E.g., Mundy and Riesenberg, supra note __ at 50.  It would also not seem to be a coincidence that 
there are twelve members traditionally on a jury, and that these medieval town councils often had a judicial 
function.
279
 Scott, supra note __ at 151.
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Staple in Calais had twenty-four members, while the 1505 charter of the 
Company of Merchant Adventurers authorized the election of twenty-four 
assistants.280  Twenty-four was also the number of assistants in the Russia 
Company, the number of assistants in the Eastland Company, the number of 
committees in the East India Company, and the number of directors of the Bank 
of England.281  Beyond the similarities in numbers, there is also similarity in the 
descriptions of the sort of persons who were to serve on these governing groups.  
The earlier discussion of the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers pointed out how this charter called for the election of “the most sadd 
[sic] discreet and honest persons.”282  Similar language calling for the more 
“discreet,” honest” and “sad” persons was often found in descriptions of 
appropriate members for English town councils.283  In addition, the chief 
executive of the Company of the Merchants of the Staple was called the 
mayor.284
3. The Motivations for Town Councils
Given the strong evidence that early corporate boards were either an 
imitation of town councils, or at least must have stemmed from similar ideas 
about governance, examining the reasoning behind the use of town councils 
could provide an insight into the motivations for the early corporations selecting 
governance through boards.  Unfortunately, it turns out that the motivations 
behind the use of town councils are themselves subject to considerable 
uncertainty.  The problem is that town councils arose during a period for which 
records are scarce.285  What is generally accepted is that early medieval towns 
typically were run under a representative of the king,286 a local noble,287 or the 
clergy.288  We also know, as detailed above, that towns in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries increasingly had councils.  Unfortunately, the evidence is 
280
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
281
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.  The 1593 charter of the Levant Company called for 
twelve assistants, while both the 1605 charter of this company and the charter of the Massachusetts Bay 
Company called for eighteen (one and one-half times twelve) assistants.  See text accompanying notes __ supra.  
Even outliers, such as the seven board members of the Hudson’s Bay Company, or the thirteen members of the 
“Council of Virginia” originally governing the London Company (See text accompanying notes __ supra), may 
simply have come from taking the traditional numbers of twelve or six and adding one extra member to avoid 
tie votes.
282
 See text accompanying note __ supra.  Similar language exists in the charter of the Russia 
Company.  See text accompanying note __ supra.  Interestingly, the charter of the Russia Company, in addition 
to establishing a board of twenty-four assistants, also called for the election of four "consuls."  As discussed 
earlier, the title "consul" comes from Italian municipal governments. 
283 E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 119 (quoting language which called for the “more honest and 
discreet,” the “more discreet and fit,” or the “wiser and sadder” to serve on town councils)[get footnotes to this 
source to see if these were from town charters].
284
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
285 E.g., Thompson, supra note __ at 766.
286
 English towns, as mentioned above, commonly had an official called a reeve, who was 
responsible to the king for collecting taxes and had the chief voice in the town.  E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 132.  
Incidentally, when such an official was appointed for a shire, he was known as the shire reeve, or sheriff.
287
 Medieval nobles commonly exercised control over villages by having jurisdiction in the noble’s 
court to hear most all criminal and civil cases involving the inhabitants of villages within the noble’s territory.  
E.g., Swanson, supra note __ at 74.
288
 In Germany, bishops typically were the lord of the town.  E.g., Rorig, supra note __ at 19, 22. 
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limited as to exactly how and why municipal government traveled from this 
beginning point to this end point.  
As discussed above, the creation of the Ipswich council gives us an 
example for which documentation is relatively complete as compared with other 
towns.  The Ipswich chronicler mentions three organs of town government: the 
officers (the two bailiffs and four coroners); the council of twelve chief portmen; 
and the assembly of the town acting as a whole, which elected the officers and 
decided to have a council of chief portmen.  The existence of these three organs 
of town government suggests that the burgesses of Ipswich had, generally 
speaking, three evident choices for municipal governance.  They could simply 
have had the officers (which was all that the charter commanded).289  They could 
have had the officers coupled with assemblies of the whole town.  Instead, they 
choose a third alternative – officers coupled with a town council.  Using the 
language of corporate or business governance, the burgesses choose governance 
by a board, rather than governance solely by managing executives, or a 
partnership style scheme of all members of the community participating in 
management.  The principal reason the Ipswich burgesses gave for making this 
choice is that other free boroughs had such councils; but this rationale simply 
forces us to ask why other towns had created councils.  As illustrated by the 
alternatives facing Ipswich, the broad question, in turn, breaks down into two 
subsidiary inquires: Why have a council rather than assemblies of the whole 
town?  And, why have a council rather than having governance solely by 
executive officials?  
Historians have propounded a number of explanations for towns 
choosing a council over assemblies of all of the burgesses.  One set of 
explanations consists of relatively benign practicality concerns.  These include 
the lack of interest by all of the burgesses in attending town assemblies,290 the 
notion (which is rather elitist) that many of the burgesses lacked the knowledge 
or judgment necessary to make quality decisions,291 and the simple logistical 
problems entailed in holding meetings with increasing numbers of participants.292
Needless to say, these concerns remain the reasons often still expressed for 
centralized versus partnership style management in the modern business 
corporation with numerous shareholders.293  Other historians take a less benign 
289
 At first glance, one might be tempted to equate the four coroners of Ipswich as being something 
of a board.  Later sources suggest, however, that the purpose of having a number of persons as coroners (or in 
similar positions) was not to have group action, as in a board, but rather to allow busy burgesses (who might 
need to travel out of town on trade) to rotate who among the four would carry out the responsibilities of the 
office. E.g., Swanson, supra note __ at 91.
290 E.g., Lorraine Attreed, THE KING’S TOWNS: IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL IN LATE 
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH BOROUGHS 18 (19__).  Support for this rationalization comes from some of the 
medieval documents establishing town councils, which contain passages that explain such action was necessary 
because of poor attendance at assemblies, and that adopt requirements for council members to take an oath that 
they will attend meetings.  E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 192.
291 E.g., Clark & Slack, supra note __ at 128 (quoting complaints by the magistrates of Gloucester 
about the difficulties of dealing in any matter “where the multitude of burgesses have a voice”); Platt, supra
note __ at 119 (quoting complaints directed at assemblies in Leicester and Northampton where “great trouble” 
ostensibly resulted “by reason of the multitude of the inhabitants being of little substance and of no discretion, 
who exceed in the assemblies the other approved, discreet, and well disposed persons”).
292 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 112.  The fact that smaller towns retained open assemblies 
(e.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 196) supports this as a factor.
293
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
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view, finding the use of councils to be a mechanism for oligarchies of wealthier 
merchants to freeze lower classes out of power.294
The other question is why the burgesses did not just leave the executive 
officials (the bailiffs and coroners) in charge of the town.  After all, such an 
action both would have avoided the practicality problems with assemblies, and 
would have allowed an oligarchy of wealthier burgesses to cut others out of 
power.  Perhaps the explanation is simply that all the wealthier burgesses, while 
desiring to cut the poorer townsfolk out of power, wished to preserve their own 
voice in municipal governance.  If true, this would be consistent with the notion 
that boards (if they have the same motivation as town councils) exist so that 
larger shareholders can elect themselves to a position in which they can protect 
their interests.295  Yet, if the town councils existed solely to provide a direct voice 
for the powerful members of the community, then one might expect the number 
on the council to equal the number of persons with both influence and a desire to 
have such a voice.  In this event, the size of the councils ought to be all sorts of 
numbers reflecting the random number of persons of influence in various 
communities.  Instead, what one finds, as pointed out before, is that town 
councils commonly consisted of twelve, or some multiple or fraction of twelve, 
members.  This use of symbolically significant numbers suggests that town 
councils, like medieval parliaments, were a reflection of medieval European 
political ideas concerning the need for collective governance by representatives 
(even if the representatives are not from the entire town, but only from the 
wealthier inhabitants).  
One plausible explanation for having a town council, rather than just 
executive officials, comes from the tasks assigned to the council.  In the middle 
of empowering the council to govern and maintain the borough and to do 
whatever should be done for the well-being and honor of the town – all quite 
undefined – the one specific function assigned the Ipswich council, according to 
the chronicler, is to “render judgments” for the town.  This parallels the initial 
task of the echevins of Saint-Omer, which was to judge cases involving the 
294 E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 119-124.  See also Reynolds, supra note __ at 191 (stating that until 
recently almost all historians had viewed the replacement of assemblies with town councils as a ploy by the 
patriciate to entrench its power; but Professor Reynolds rejects this thesis). While such debates over motivations 
are typical, and often irresolvable, grist for historical scholarship, an added complication with the establishment 
of town councils is that it is often unclear precisely what form of governance the medieval town council 
replaced.  A traditional, and perhaps romantic, narrative views councils as representing a deviation from earlier 
governance in which the towns operated through assemblies of the whole.  Id.  In a way, the Ipswich chronicle 
supports this story, as an assembly of the town created the council, as well as took a variety of other steps to get 
the borough organized.   Moreover, unless one assumes that the idea of calling an assembly of the town 
occurred to the Ipswich burgesses out of thin air, one might imagine that governance through such assemblies 
could have been occurring before the town received its charter (at least insofar as the matters addressed by the 
assembly did not intrude into topics (taxes) of interest to the reeve or local noble).  E.g., Reynolds, supra note 
__ at ch. VII p. 6.  If one accepts this narrative, then the choice by the burgesses of Ipswich (as well as other 
such towns) to shift from governance by officials and open assemblies, to governance by officials and town 
councils, presaged the much later decisions by the Merchants of the Staple and the Merchant Adventurers 
similarly to shift from having a mayor (for the Merchants of the Staple) or governor (for the Merchant 
Adventurers), plus assemblies of the whole membership, to having a mayor or governor, plus a council or a 
board of assistants.  An alternate narrative, however, views the council as having taken over directly from the 
previous control by noble, king or clergy.  E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 40, 174.  Under this view, the 
assembly of the town in Ipswich simply would have been an convocation to provide formal acceptance of a 
governing council whose existence may well have predated the charter.
295
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burgesses of the town.  As reflected in these two examples, one of the primary 
roles of the early town councils was to adjudicate disputes (especially mercantile 
disputes).296  Accordingly, an underlying philosophy behind the establishment of 
town councils in lieu of governance solely by executive officials was a 
preference for collective determinations of contested matters in adjudication.297
This, of course, is still the preference reflected in the continuing right to trial by 
jury.  To the extent that some of the function of the parliaments in medieval 
European kingdoms was adjudication of disputes,298 this philosophy also partially 
explains the establishment of such parliaments.  To what extent then does this 
function pertain to the corporate board of directors?  The medieval preference for 
adjudicative decisions by a group rather than an individual seems to support 
Professor Bainbridge’s rationalization of corporate boards as justified by the 
superiority of group decisions in matters of judgment299 – even if medieval 
European societies had not formally studied psychology.  On the other hand, the 
question of whether a group is better able to evaluate evidence presented in an 
adjudication (say to determine whether the evidence proves O.J. killed Nicole, 
just to give an example) may or may not be the same as whether a group is better 
able to evaluate a prospective merger.  Yet, the question raised in this paper is 
not why current corporations hypothetically might have chosen board governance 
if writing on a clean slate divorced from the forces of history and tradition.  
Rather, the question is why did the early trading corporations, such as the 
Company of Merchant Adventurers, choose this institution, thereby setting the 
pattern others followed.  In answering this question, it is seems very useful to 
keep in mind that a major function of the board of assistants of the Company of 
Merchant Adventurers was, like the early town councils, the adjudication of 
mercantile disputes.300
The Ipswich chronicle also provides a significant clue as a second 
purpose behind establishing a town council.  The chronicle states that the council 
members are to have full power to act for themselves and the town.  We 
encountered the concept of full power (plena potestas) before when discussing 
medieval European parliaments.301  It went along with the Roman or Canon Law 
doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (what touches all is to be 
approved by all).  In other words, the reason that representatives to a medieval 
parliament, or the members of the Ipswich town council, required full power was 
because the law required consent of all members of the community to actions 
impacting the community.302  This meant that if town decisions were not going to 
be approved in open assemblies, there should be a council composed of 
296 E.g., Rorig, supra note __ at 161.
297 E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 23-34.  The reintroduction of Roman law in the twelfth century 
led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in lieu of adjudication by collective groups, as had been 
characteristic of earlier medieval Europe.  Resistance to this trend occurred in the preservation of trial by jury in 
England, and, significantly for purposes of this paper, in mercantile matters, where assemblies or groups of 
merchants continued to try disputes.  Id at 51-58.
298
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
299
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
300
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
301
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
302 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 73 (medieval jurists applied the doctrine of "what touches all is to be 
approved by all" to civic government).
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representatives with the power to approve such actions.  
As with medieval parliaments, the idea of representation by a town 
council in medieval Europe differed in some ways from what we often now think 
of by representation.  For example, as with medieval parliaments, the idea of 
representation in the medieval town council did not necessarily equate with 
democratic election.  Numerous town councils in England and elsewhere were 
self-perpetuating (in other words, the existing members selected new members as 
vacancies arose).303  Indeed, the Ipswich council itself was elected through a 
process in which the bailiffs and coroners selected four persons from each parish, 
who, in turn, chose the twelve chief portmen.304  Of course, as discussed earlier in 
this paper,305 such self-perpetuation, or selection of board members by officers, 
remains the reality, even if not the theory, in the modern widely-held corporation.  
The earlier discussion of medieval European parliaments also noted that each 
member of the parliament represented and bound the particular corporate group 
(such as a town) that sent the representative.306  This is different from the concept 
of representation entailed in a corporate board elected at large by all the owners.  
Interestingly, the medieval European town councils straddled both concepts of 
representation.  Members in many medieval town councils were chosen by, and 
presumably represented, geographic divisions of the town (wards) or the 
particular corporate groups within the town (individual guilds).307  The Ipswich 
chronicle, however, describes the chief portmen, although selected from different 
parishes, as having full power to represent the entire town, rather than each 
representing his individual parish.  Since there is no indication that the portmen 
(rather than the bailiffs and coroners) were the agents of the town in dealing with 
outsiders, the representation by the chief portmen of the entire town is the same 
concept as the representation of the entire shareholders by a board elected at 
large.  All told, whether democratically elected or not, whether representing 
different parts of the town or not, the town council was representative insofar as 
it existed to fulfill the function of providing consent on behalf of the whole town 
when assemblies became impractical.
Significantly, the need for this concept of representation appears to flow 
in substantial measure from medieval ideas of collectives as corporations.  As 
discussed earlier, medieval towns operated in such a fashion and assumed such 
an identity that they became a corporate entity (what medieval jurists referred to 
as a “universitates”), even before fifteenth century towns in England sought 
formal status as a “corporation.”308  Both in popular conception, and in juristic 
303 E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 120.
304 E.g, Stephenson, supra note __ at 175.
305
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
306
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
307 E.g., Mundy & Riesenberg, supra note __ at 80.
308 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 24.  Just as there are different concepts of the corporation, as 
discussed earlier, there are also differences in terminology.  The term “corporation” stems from a metaphor to a 
human body.  E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at ch. VI p.12.  Indeed, the charter of the East India Company 
charters referred to the company as a “body corporate.”  See text accompanying note __ supra.  This metaphor 
of a group as a body assumed greater significance as late- and post-medieval lawyers and judges started viewing 
rights, such as holding property or appearing in court, as only being available to persons (including state-created 
corporate persons), and not simply to groups.  E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at ch. VI pp.12-16.  It was this 
view that provoked late medieval municipalities to seek charters making them corporations in the sense of a 
fictitious person created by an act of the state.  Universitates comes from the Roman Law universitas, which 
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theory, this existence as a corporate entity carried within it certain norms as to 
governance.  One norm, which formed a basis for the towns’ claims to self-
government, was that the members of a corporative collective were entitled to 
make their own rules as to the internal affairs of the collective.309  The other 
norm, which is central to the present discussion, is that such collectives made 
decisions by common consent, in other words, by the consent of all of the 
members of the collective.310  Ideally, this meant unanimous consent of all of the 
members of the collective.311  Practicality, however, dictated compromise with 
this ideal.  Hence, there could be majority rule in case of irreconcilable 
disagreement,312 and, critically here, there should be a council of representatives 
if open assemblies become impractical.313
This leads the question of what was the origin of these corporate norms, 
particularly regarding consent through representation.  The political historian, 
Anthony Black, traces the medieval European corporate norm of common 
consent, if necessary through a council of representatives, to three sources.314
One source consists of Roman ideas of republican rule.   Of course, a skeptic 
might wonder how much influence of Roman republican writers, such as Cicero, 
could have had on medieval thinking, since Rome, itself, had not been a republic 
for five hundred years before its fall.  Still, especially for Italian cities, Roman 
republican sources could have provided a handy reinforcement in support of 
those seeking governance through representative councils.  Germanic traditions 
provide a second possible source.  On the tribal level, early German tribes 
operated through popular assemblies in which all members had a duty to attend.  
As suggested earlier,315 this tradition presumably also played a role in leading to 
the medieval parliaments.  Another Germanic tradition involved the guilds.  
Because the early guilds constituted entirely voluntary associations unable to 
coerce dissenting members, they were almost of necessity governed by common 
consent.  Christian ideas of community, as practiced by Church organizations, 
provided a third source for the norm of common consent.  We shall look at the 
guilds and Church organizations in some detail below.
If town councils incorporate notions of collective decision-making and 
representation, do they also embody the supremacy over executive officers called 
for under the current board-centered approach to corporate governance?  
Medieval European municipalities varied as far as whether the council appointed 
town officials, such as the mayor.316  In any event, municipal constitutions calling 
encompassed a variety of associations known as collegia (colleges), corpora (bodies) and sodalitates, and 
reflected the Roman Law and earlier medieval European tradition that groups, and not just persons, could hold 
property and have legal rights.  E.g., Conard, supra note __ at § 65.
309 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 25 (citing the medieval jurist, Bartolus, for the proposition that any 
universitates can make rules about its own affairs), 52 (applying this proposition to the towns’ claims for self 
government).  Ironically, while towns might point to their corporate status as universitates in order to justify 
their claims to self-government, guilds also could point to their status as universitates in order to claim a right to 
regulate their trade in contravention of city laws.  Id at 25 (citing the medieval jurist, Baldus).
310 Id at 53.
311 E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 190.
312 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 61.
313 Id at 25.
314
 Black, supra note __ at 53-65.
315
 See note __ supra.
316 E.g., 
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for the appointment of the mayor or other executive officials by town councils 
may have been more a means to cut broader assemblies out of the process than a 
means to ensure council control over executive officials.317  Indeed, there seems 
to be little evidence that medieval Europeans viewed the role of the town council 
in a manner parallel to the current notion that corporate boards exist principally 
as a tool to monitor management.  Interestingly, for example, the Ipswich 
chronicle states that one of the tasks of the four coroners (rather than the chief 
portmen) was to superintend the acts of the bailiffs.318  Finally, it is worth noting 
that if monitoring town officials against corruption was one of the purposes of 
town councils, the evidence suggests that town councils were not very successful 
in the undertaking.319  In fact, perhaps the early failures of town councils to 
prevent corruption by municipal officials should have been seen as a harbinger of 
the perennial failure of corporate boards as a monitoring tool, all the way to 
Enron.
C.   Guilds
Medieval Europe had numerous fraternal organizations referred to by a 
variety of labels, among the most common of which is “guild.”320  Many were 
simply social or religious fraternities organized for communal feasting and 
drinking and mutual defense and support.321  Of greater relevance here are guilds 
with more of an economic focus.  Historians typically divide these economically 
oriented, or trade, guilds into two types: craft guilds and merchant guilds.322
There is a direct relationship between the governance of medieval 
European guilds and of the early trading companies.  This is because the early 
trading companies, such as the Merchant Adventurers, were in large measure 
little more than merchant guilds themselves, which then evolved into the joint 
stock companies, all the while continuing the tradition of board governance.  
Moreover, working backwards even further, the precedent setting adoption of 
board governance by the Company of Merchant Adventurers in its 1505 charter 
seems to have been an outgrowth of the Merchant Adventurers’ relationship with 
a merchant guild known as the Mercers Company.
The Mercers Company was a guild of London merchants.323  In the mid-
317 E.g. Platt, supra note __ at 120.
318 E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 175.  On the other hand, the notion that the coroners 
themselves were acting as some sort of monitoring board would seem undermined by the fact that the two 
bailiffs were also two of the four coroners.
319 E.g., Clark & Slack, supra note __ at 132-133.  The complaint that management often controls 
current corporate boards by limiting the directors’ access to information (see text accompanying note __ supra) 
finds its parallel in the observation that secrecy by the mayor and other civic officials kept the city councils of 
seventeenth century England in the dark.  Clark & Slack, supra note __ at 131.
320 E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 72.  The term “guild” (also spelled “gild”) probably comes from 
the German “geld” as in money paid in for dues.  E.g., Baldwin, supra note __ at 55.
321 E.g., H.W.C. Davis, supra note __ at 300-301.
322 Id. Reality, however, often belied the notion of a neat division between guilds of craftsmen or 
artisans, who made things, and guilds of merchants, who bought and sold things.  For example, the so-called 
guild merchant of the early English towns may have included butchers, bakers, carpenters, masons, and all sorts 
of other craftsmen, who later formed craft guilds.  E.g., Salzman, supra note __ at 71.
323
 Indeed, the name “mercer," comes from the Latin, “mercator,” meaning merchant.  Evidencing 
the close relationship between merchant guilds and medieval town government, the Mercers boast that the first 
two mayors of London in the early thirteenth century were Mercers.  E.g., P.H. Ditchfield, THE CITY 
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fourteenth century, an assembly of London merchants adopted a code of rules for 
the Mercers Company, which, among other things, provided for the annual 
selection of four masters to govern the group.  The Mercers received their first 
royal charter in 1393.  The charter granted the Mercers the corporate attributes of 
perpetual existence and the right to hold property.324  The 1393 charter also 
empowered the membership to elect annually four wardens to supervise the 
company.325  It is unlikely, however, that either the four masters or the four 
wardens constituted a board as such.  Instead, it is likely that these masters or 
wardens functioned as executive officers, with the multiple number allowing a 
rotation of responsibilities in order to avoid overburdening merchants busy with 
their own business,326 and with significant decisions left for assemblies of the 
general membership whenever needed.  One reason for reaching this conclusion 
is because, in 1463, the Mercers changed their governance structure to introduce 
what is clearly a board.  Declaring that it was “odious and grievous” to hold 
many meetings of the membership, especially “for matters of no great effect,” the 
membership of company passed a resolution that called for the election every 
year of twelve “sad and discreet” members to be assistants to the wardens.327
The function of the assistants was to make decisions jointly with the wardens that 
all members of the guild would follow – in other words, to replace general 
assemblies with representative group decision-making.  
Two facts establish the connection between the Mercers’ action in 1463 
and the board governance provision found four decades later in the charter of the 
Merchant Adventurers.328  One is the obvious similarity in the two boards: 
Members of both boards had the title of assistants.  While the Mercers board 
contained twelve members, and the Merchant Adventurers had twenty-four, 
twelve or twenty-four, as discussed earlier,329 were the traditional numbers of 
members on medieval town councils.  Further, in both cases, we see the same 
sort of language about the nature of persons to serve (“sad and discreet”).  The 
second fact is even more telling.  As discussed earlier,330 at the time of the 1463 
Mercers’ resolution, the London merchants engaged in export of manufactured 
goods (merchant adventurers) were a part of the Mercers Company, insofar as 
they formed any group at all.331  Hence, in establishing board governance, the 
1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was simply continuing to 
use a structure under which the London based merchant adventurers, as part of 
COMPANIES OF LONDON AND THEIR GOOD WORKS: A RECORD OF THEIR HISTORY, CHARITY 
AND TREASURE 18 (1904).
324
 As discussed earlier (see text accompanying note __ supra), the purpose of seeking this charter 
was probably to allow the company to hold property despite the prohibition on mortmain, which legislation, in 
1391, extended to reach towns and guilds that lacked charters expressly empowering property ownership in 
perpetuity.
325 E.g., Ditchfield, supra note __ at 19-20. 
326
 See note __ supra (discussing the practice of medieval towns electing four coroners in order to 
allow burgesses, who were busy with travel and business, to rotate who would carry out the duties of the office).
327 E.g., O’Donnell, supra note __ at 63; Ditchfield, supra note __ at 20.
328
 For a discussion of the 1505 charter of the Merchant Adventurers, see text accompanying notes 
__ supra.
329
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
330
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
331
  In fact, despite the 1505 charter, the Merchant Adventurers kept their minutes in the same book 
with the Mercers’ until 1526.  E.g., Cheyney, supra note __ at 166.
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the Mercers, already operated.332
Given that the guilds are the most direct source for the use of boards in 
the early trading companies, the question becomes why did the guilds themselves 
adopt the use of boards.  As suggested by the earlier discussion of medieval town 
councils,333 municipal government probably influenced guild government.334
Nevertheless, it would oversimplify the origins of corporate boards to view the 
guilds simply as a conduit that imitated town councils, and then, by turning into 
the early trading companies, established the pattern for later corporate boards.  
This is because, as also mentioned earlier,335 it is possible as well to view the 
guilds as one of the sources leading to the medieval European towns’ use of 
councils.  In other words, guilds and towns were inexorably linked in a 
relationship in which ideas and practices traveled both ways, and that, in turn, 
reflected a broader set of political ideas and practices also spurring the use of 
parliaments in medieval Europe.
To understand the development of boards in the medieval guilds, it helps 
to start by asking what sort of decisions and tasks were involved in the 
governance of the guilds.  Probably the most important decisions were the 
admission of new members336 and the adoption of ordinances governing the 
members’ conduct.337  Collection and appropriate use of funds from the members 
meant that there was a need for financial administration.338  Significantly, guilds 
also commonly sought to resolve disputes involving their members, which, in 
turn, led the merchant guilds often into performing the role of a sort of mercantile 
court.339
In their early years, the guilds made these decisions and carried out these 
tasks through a governance structure consisting of a combination of executive 
officers and general meetings of all the membership.340  Significant decisions, 
including admission of new members and the adoption of ordinances to regulate 
the guild, occurred at meetings of all the membership.  These meetings, often 
332
 A somewhat similar connection may exist between the London based Grocers Company, the 
Levant Company, and, in turn, the East India Company.  The Grocers – which probably began as a guild of 
merchants that dealt at wholesale (en gros) (e.g., Ditchfield, supra note __ at 34) – elected a board of six 
assistants as early as 1397.  E.g., Lujo Brentano, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF TRADE-UNIONS 62 (1870).  The Levant Company appears to have been related to the 
Grocers, as evidenced by the Levant Company’s use of the Grocers’ hall for the Levant Company’s meetings 
until 1666.  E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. II, p. 224.  The East India Company, in turn, used the books of the 
Levant Company for the East India Company’s initial organizational meetings.  Id.  Indeed, the origins of the 
East India Company in earlier guilds reverberated for many years in the continuation by the East India 
Company of various guild traditions, including calling shareholders "brothers" and requiring they take oaths of 
membership.  E.g., Scott, supra note __ at  vol. I, p. 152.
333
 See text accompanying notes __ supra. 
334 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 58 (craft guilds not infrequently used the pattern of city government 
as a model).
335
 See text accompanying notes __ supra. 
336 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, pp. 152-153.
337
 Such ordinances often addressed personal behavior so as to promote the members’ living a 
virtuous life.  E.g., Baldwin, supra note __ at 56-57.  In the craft and merchant guilds, the ordinances typically 
regulated the quality of goods and honesty in dealings.  E.g., H.W.C. Davis, supra note __ at 304, 310.
338 Id at 304.
339 E.g., Swanson supra note __ at 77.  
340 Along similar lines, medieval European universities, such as at Bologna, Paris and Oxford, 
followed a governance model based upon general assemblies of students (the Bologna model) or masters (the 
Paris model), who elected officers (rectors and the like). E.g., Lowrie J. Daly, THE MEDIEVAL 
UNIVERSITY 1200-1400 30-75 (19__).
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called a “morgensprache” (morning speech), occurred at least annually and often 
were accompanied by ceremonies and festivities.341  Commonly, the guild 
members at the annual morgensprache elected officers for the guild.342  Among 
the tasks of the chief officer(s) of the guild would be presiding over the 
morgensprache, caring for the guild’s property, collecting fees due the guild, 
enforcement of the guild’s ordinances, and attempting to settle disputes between 
members of the guild.343  On the other hand, if the enforcement of an ordinance, 
or the resolution of a dispute, required adjudication, then the matter commonly 
went before the whole membership at the morgensprache.344
While, at the early stage, the guild governance structure contained 
nothing like a board of directors, this early governance structure is nevertheless 
significant to the history of the corporate board.  To begin with, the early guild 
governance structure, consisting of general membership meetings and elected 
executive officials, appears to parallel the governance structure of both the 
Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers before these two early trading companies adopted board 
governance.345  In other words, these two early trading companies evolved in 
their governance in same manner as many guilds evolved in the guilds’ 
governance.  This further evidences the link between the development of board 
governance in guilds and its development in the early trading companies.  
In addition, the early guild tradition of decisions by general assemblies 
made an important contribution to the ultimate development of boards.  This is 
because, as mentioned earlier when discussing the motivations for the 
development of town councils,346 guild practices were one of the sources for the 
idea that decisions impacting an entire collective group required the consent of 
all in the group.  At the earliest time, when guilds were probably more fraternal 
organizations for drinking and mutual aid and defense, than for coordinated 
economic activity, the principle of unanimous consent may have been the result 
of simple practicalities – if someone did not like the decision, they could leave.347
Moreover, the basic notion of a brotherhood, whose members shared festivities 
and looked out for each other, seems intuitively more conducive to collective and 
consensus based decision-making, than it is to a command-oriented hierarchical 
governance.348  Over time, however, what started as simple practicality, or 
intuitive notions of brotherhood, became embedded in custom and norm – and 
even could influence Canon Law jurists to turn a Roman Law doctrine of quod 
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all") 
341 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 24.
342 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 152. Guilds varied in the titles and roles of such officers.  
The Ipswich chronicle describes the election of an alderman to head the guild merchant for the town, with four 
others to assist.  See text accompanying notes __ supra.  As discussed above, the Mercers elected four 
individuals, at first called masters, and later called wardens, to be the executive officers for the guild.  The 
Calimala Guild (the guild of the cloth merchants) in Florence had four consuls and a treasurer as its senior 
executive officers.  E.g., Edgcumbe Staley, THE GUILDS OF FLORENCE 117 (1906).
343 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, 152.
344 Id at 153.
345
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
346
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
347
 In a rough way, this is John Locke’s social contract theory writ small and in a real world context.
348 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 57.
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from a technical rule into a broad principle of governance.  This, in turn, meant 
that when general assemblies became impractical in guilds or towns, some 
institution was needed to step in and give consent on behalf of the overall 
community.  In the case of towns, this institution was the town council.  As 
suggested by the discussion of the Mercers Company, in the case of the guilds, 
this institution was also a council or a board of assistants.
The switch by guilds to using boards occurred gradually across Europe.  
In Italy, fourteenth century Florentine guilds provide examples of the use of 
complex systems of councils that mirrored the complexity of Florentine city 
government.349  Guilds in some German cities had six or eight person councils by 
the fourteenth century.350  In England, a merchant guild council of twenty-four 
members (who were virtually the same persons who served on the twenty-four 
member town council) existed at Leicester in the mid thirteenth century.351
Documents of London’s Grocers Company record the selection in 1397 of six 
persons to aid the wardens in the discharge of their duties.352  By and large, 
however, the move by the guilds toward the use of boards of assistants occurred 
in the fifteenth (as illustrated by the Mercers Company) and sixteenth 
centuries.353
As with the development of town councils, there are different theories as 
to what prompted the guilds to switch to the use of boards.  The Mercers’ 
resolution suggests that the motive lay in the burden on the members entailed by 
holding assemblies for less important matters.354   Yet, this raises the question of 
what were these less important matters that produced burdensome meetings.  
Since the matters that went before the morgensprache were admission of new 
members, adoption of ordinances, election of officers, and adjudication of 
disputes, and since admission of new members, adoption of ordinances, and 
election of officers generally occurred at the annual morgensprache – which, as 
an occasion of festival and ceremony, would take place anyway and presumably 
would be well attended – it seems that the principal matters that called for overly 
frequent meetings would have been the adjudication of disputes.  Hence, it 
appears that a primary reason for the board of assistants would have been to hear 
disputes.  The parallel with the early town councils, such as the Ipswich chief 
portmen or the echevins of Saint-Omer, for whom adjudication was a primary 
task,355 is obvious.  Similarly, adjudication of disputes was a function of the 
board of assistants of the Merchant Adventurers.356  In all of these cases, the 
common ideology producing boards, which remains reflected in the jury system, 
is the desire for collective judgment in adjudications.  
349 E.g. Staley, supra note __ at 119 (discussing the two councils in the Calimala guild).
350
 Brentano, supra note __ at 62 (giving the examples of the Spinwetter guild at Bale and the Tailors 
guild of Vienna).
351 E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 133.
352
 See note __ supra.
353 E.g., Brentano, supra note __ at 62.  Indeed, the guild merchant at Ipswich appears to have had a 
familiar looking board of twenty-four by the time of James I.  E.g., Scott, supra note __ at vol. I, p.7.
354
 One can find a reflection of such a burden in the apparent difficulty the guilds had in obtaining 
attendance at general meetings, as evidenced by the adoption of quorum requirements (e.g. Brentano, supra
note __ at 62) and penalties for non-attendance (e.g., O’Donnell, supra note __ at 63).
355
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
356
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
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The alternate explanation for the development of boards of assistants in 
the guilds also finds a parallel in town councils.  Many historians contend that the 
boards in the guilds, like the town councils, represented an attempt by the 
wealthier members to cut other members out of governance.357  However, given 
the custom and norm of collective consent, it presumably would not have been 
acceptable to place entire control in the guild officers.  The solution is the 
creation of boards of assistants with, as illustrated by the Mercers’ resolution, a 
symbolically significant number of twelve (or a multiple or fraction of twelve) 
members, and with agreement by the membership to accept the decisions of the 
board. 
This just leaves the question of the extent to which the boards in the 
guilds served to monitor and control the guild’s officers.  Particularly in the 
sixteenth century, the boards of assistants of many of the London guilds acquired 
the power to appoint officers in lieu of appointment by the membership at the 
annual meeting.358  Yet, as suggested by the roughly parallel developments 
involving English town councils,359 transfer of the power to elect the guild’s 
officers from general assemblies to boards of assistants may have been more an 
effort to shut out the general membership, than it was an effort to establish 
monitoring by the boards.  Also, as with town councils, when the guilds wanted 
to delegate monitoring of their officers, they often did this by assigning the task 
to a smaller group, rather than to the board of assistants.  For example, records of 
the London based Grocers guild show the selection of four auditors “to 
superintend the accounts and delivery of the wardens.”360  Similarly, monitoring 
of the consuls and treasurer (the senior executive officers) of Florence’s Calimala 
guild was the function of three “sindacatori” (general inspectors), rather than the 
responsibility of either the twelve person general council or the eighteen person 
special council of the guild.361
D.   Church Councils
No discussion of representative bodies in Europe of the middles ages 
would be complete without reference to the councils in various institutions of the 
Church.  Admittedly, there is not the extensive evidence of linkage between the 
Church councils and the boards of the early trading companies that one discovers 
when dealing with the councils of towns and guilds.  Still, given the central role
of the Church in medieval European life and thought, it would be surprising if no 
intellectual commonality existed between Church councils and trading company 
boards.
Councils existed on a variety of levels in the western European Church 
357 E.g., Brentano, supra note __ at 87-88.  Evidence that an oligarchic power grab, rather than 
general membership complaints about burdensome meetings, may have been behind the establishment of boards 
of assistants includes the eventual replacement of elected boards by self-perpetuating boards (in which existing 
board members selected new board members), and protests by members in some of the guilds, such as London’s 
Weavers, about the changes.  Id.
358 E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 213.
359
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
360
 Brentano, supra note __ at 62.
361
 Staley, supra note __ at 122.
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during the middle ages.  Provincial synods and local church councils met fairly 
frequently in some parts of medieval Europe.362  Of more far reaching influence 
were the general councils of the Church.  From the first ecumenical council 
convened at Nicaea in 325, councils occurred among representatives of some or 
all of the five patriarchal sees (Constantinople, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch and 
Jerusalem).  These councils were chiefly concerned with religious doctrine, and 
recognition of their pronouncements as authoritative established councils as the 
highest authority within the Church on questions of doctrine.363  An important 
development in using councils as a tool of governance occurred in the middle of 
the eleventh century, when the College of Cardinals obtained the power to elect 
the Pope.  Originally, cardinals were simply certain Roman clergy who 
performed liturgical functions in the great basilicas, but, in the eleventh century, 
the College of Cardinals became the Pope's close counselors, and, in 1059, 
Nicholas II issued a decree granting the College the power to elect the Pope.364
The immediate motivation for this development was to remove the intervention 
of lay officials (such as the Holy Roman Emperor) in the selection of Popes.365
The long-range impact, however, was to advance a model of group selection of a 
chief official (as in boards and CEOs).  It also inevitably raised the question of 
whether the power to elect gave the power to remove.
The implications of the power of the College of Cardinals to elect the 
Pope came to roost in the so-called Great Schism.  A decision of the College of 
Cardinals in 1378 to recant their election of Urban VI, and to elect Clementine 
VI instead, led to the embarrassing spectacle of two competing lines of Popes 
(one in Avignon and the other in Rome).366  After several earlier efforts failed, 
the Council of Constance in 1414 through 1418 resolved the schism with decrees 
that appeared to establish the supremacy of councils within the Roman Church.  
362 E.g., Antony Black, COUNCIL AND COMMUNE: THE CONCILAR MOVEMENT AND THE 
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY HERITAGE 9 (1979).  The degree to which institutions affiliated with the Church of 
medieval Western Europe followed a representative governance structure varied.  The Dominican Order, which 
received papal approbation in 1216, provides an example of representative governance by an organization 
within the medieval Church.  The constitutions of the Dominican Order contained regulations for daily life and 
for the government of the Order.  There were three levels of government – the local convent, the provincial 
chapter, and the general chapter.  The members of each convent elected a prior, who governed along with the 
friars (members) in accordance with the constitution and the rules of the Order.  The prior and two delegates 
from each convent in the province elected the provincial prior and provincial chapter (a governing council).  
The provincial chapters, in turn, elected the members of the general chapter (the governing council for the 
overall Order).  The general chapter had the power to enact legislation changing the regulations governing the 
Order.  The general chapter met annually until 1370, and thereafter met every two or three years.  Interestingly, 
in light of later disputes over supremacy of councils versus Popes, each chapter had the power to remove 
officials at its level.  E.g., Carstens, supra note __ at 25-28.  By contrast, the Benedictine monasteries elected an 
abbot for life, who was supposed to consult with the monks, but who had the final say in all decisions.  E.g., 
Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 51; Bisson, supra note __ at 141-142.  The Franciscans also placed greater 
authority in their executive officials (particularly the general minister at the head of the order) than the 
Dominicans, but subjected the officials to reelection at a set term and to removal for cause.  E.g., Davis, supra
note __ at vol. I, p. 64.
363 E.g., Colish, supra note __ at 340-341. Following the schism between Roman and Greek 
Churches, councils of the Roman Church, starting with the First Lateran council of 1123, typically occurred 
without representatives of the Greek Church.
364 E.g., Brian Tierney, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCILIAR THEORY: THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL CANONISTS FROM GRATIAN TO THE GREAT SCHISM 69 
(1955).
365 E.g., Colish, supra note __ at 341.
366 E.g., Tierney, supra note __ at 1-2.
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Not only did the Council of Constance depose the contenders and arrange for the 
election of a new Pope under a procedure designed by the council, it set forth a 
decree announcing that, as a legitimately assembled general council, everyone of 
whatever standing or office within the Church, including the Pope, was bound to 
obey its order eradicating the schism.  Moreover, the Council of Constance 
promulgated a second decree calling for regular councils.367  Constance turned 
out, however, to be the high point for the supremacy of councils within the 
Roman Church.  After a later council at Basil came to naught, Popes failed to call 
regular councils and effectively reduced the decree from Constance claiming 
supremacy for councils to cover only the special circumstance of resolving the 
Great Schism.368
Despite its ultimately limited impact on the governance of the Church 
itself, the Council of Constance remains important because it represented a 
culmination of thought and writings concerning the power of councils versus 
Popes (and, inferentially, other governing officials).  Some of this writing and 
thought deals with issues unique to Christianity and the constitution of the 
Church.369  Other writing and thought raised issues whose political importance 
could transcend Church governance.  For example, did election of a governing 
official by a group mean that the group also had the power of removal; which, in 
turn, raises the question of what is the source of a governing official's 
authority.370  More narrowly, recognizing that human fallibility could afflict even 
the highest governing officials, medieval scholars explored the grounds and 
procedure for removing an errant Pope.371  Given that these considerations of 
Church governance occurred as medieval European kingdoms had been 
experimenting with the power of parliamentary assemblies versus kings, 
historians have debated whether the medieval scholars of Church governance 
were drawing upon the political events occurring around them, or whether the 
political events were emanating from ideas developed as part of Church 
governance under canon law.372
For purposes of this paper what is most important about the ruminations 
of scholars in medieval Europe on the powers of Church councils versus Popes 
lies in the efforts of these scholars to draw upon medieval ideas of corporation
law -- not in the sense of a business corporation, but, as discussed before, in the 
sense of a collective society, including towns, guilds, and the Church.  Here, we 
encounter the conflict between the authoritarian views of Pope Innocent IV --
367 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 17-18.
368
 John N. Figgis, POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: 1414-1625, 53-55 
(1907)
369
 Such as whether statements attributed to Christ delegated authority to the heirs of Saint Peter (the 
Popes) or to the whole Church, and the relationship of the Roman See to the whole Church.  E.g., Tierney, 
supra note __ at __.
370 Id at 56 (citing the writing of the medieval scholar of canon law, Lurentius, who drew a 
distinction between the divine origin of the powers of the offices of Pope or Emperor, and the selection by 
human electors of which individuals occupied the offices).
371
  This meant laboring to reconcile the doctrine that a heretic could not be Pope, with the doctrine 
that only a Pope could judge what was heresy.  Id at 58-63 (discussing the effort of the medieval scholar of 
canon law, Huguccio, to reconcile the conflict).
372 Compare Id at 18-19 (canon law provided the source for conciliar ideas in the Church); Tierney, 
supra note __ (canon law principles influenced development of medieval European parliaments), with Figgis, 
supra note __ at 46-47 (medieval European parliaments influenced conciliar ideas in the Church).
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who drew upon the concept of the Church as a corporation to argue that the 
power of decision rested in the head (i.e. the bishop for the local church, or the 
Pope for the overall Church) -- and the views of the noted thirteenth century 
scholar of canon law, Cardinal-bishop Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis), who 
argued that power over a corporation resided both in the head and in the 
membership.373  Amusingly, some of the debate between proponents of the two 
schools of thought wonders off into the metaphor of the corporation as a body.  
(Indeed, the word corporation derives from the Roman "corpus" as in body.374)  
So, those supporting Innocent IV's position sometimes talk of the power of the 
head to rule the body.375  The arguments of Hostiensis, however, were not 
metaphorical.  Speaking, for example, of the power of a local bishop to alienate 
property, Hostiensis noted that this decision could produce a loss from which the 
whole of the corporation (the local church) would suffer.  Since this action, 
therefore, impacted the common welfare, it required the consent of the entire 
corporation, not just its head.376  In other words, we are back to the Roman and 
Canon Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what 
touches all is to be approved by all").  
The crisis of the Great Schism brought to the fore the role of a 
representative group, in other words a council, as the means by which the entire 
corporate body could act upon a matter that concerned all.  As stated above, long 
practice had recognized the authoritative nature of the pronouncements of general 
councils of the Church on matters of doctrine.  Medieval scholars of canon law 
provided a doctrinal explanation for this recognition by stating that action of 
general councils provided the "universal consent" necessary to make decisions on 
matters touching "the general state of the Church."377  This is reminiscent of the 
summonses, discussed earlier,378 which called upon English towns and shires to 
send representatives to parliaments with plena potestas ("full power") to consent 
to actions of the parliaments, so as to meet the requirement of quod omnes tangit 
ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all").379  Also, as 
seen before when dealing with medieval parliaments and town councils, the 
concept of representation employed by the proponents of Church councils did not 
necessarily entail democratic election.  For example, the principal proponents of 
conciliar power at Constance -- Zabarella, d'Ailly and Gerson -- asserted that the 
power of acting as a council for the whole Church rested upon the bishops.380
373 E.g., Tierney, supra note __ at 106-108.
374
 See note __ supra.
375 E.g., Gierke, supra note __ at 28-29.
376 E.g., Tierney, supra note __ at 122-124.  The concern that bishops, if not required to gain 
consent, might alienate local church property to the prejudice of the local church suggests a monitoring function 
behind the idea of consent.  Indeed, the notion that the corporate group, or its representatives, needed to keep an 
eye on potentially misbehaving officials seems to have received a stronger expression in the Church than with 
parliaments, town councils, guild councils or trading company boards. 
377 Id at 52-53.
378
 See text accompanying note __ supra. 
379
 The full power entailed in the concept of plena potestas should be distinguished from the concept 
of plenitudo potestatis ("fullness of power") accorded to the Pope.  At least as the later term grew to be 
understood, plenitudo potestatis went beyond the notion that an individual had authority to represent a broader 
group, and entailed being both the source of all authority and even above the law.  E.g., Tierney, supra note __ 
at 146-147.  
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Overall, what emerges from Church councils is additional evidence for 
an overarching medieval theory of corporate governance applicable to kingdoms, 
the Church, towns and guilds.  Under this theory, decisions impacting the entire 
corporate collective require consent of the collective.  In circumstances in which 
an assembly of the entire corporate body is impractical, consent from a group, 
who are representative in a symbolic, even if not a democratically elected, sense, 
becomes necessary.  The early trading companies applied this overarching 
ideology in adopting governing boards.
V.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
Having traced the historical and political origins of the corporate board 
of directors, the question becomes what can this tell us about the purpose of 
corporate boards today.  In fact, the history of corporate boards provides 
conflicting evidence with respect to the purposes claimed by modern scholars for 
the board-centered model of corporate governance.
The development of corporate boards, as well as the development of 
other representative institutions in the Europe of the middle ages, is consistent 
with the notion that the use of boards (like other representative institutions in 
medieval Europe), in part, arose out of problems with direct governance by 
groups that have large numbers of members (in other words, the central 
management rationale).  This is nicely illustrated by the example of the Levant 
Company, which had no board when the company started with four members, but 
received a new charter providing for a board of twelve assistants when the 
membership increased.381  Along the same lines, the apparent evolution in some 
medieval municipalities from governance involving assemblies of all townsfolk, 
to governance by town councils, occurred as medieval towns grew in 
population.382  Yet, if practicalities ruled out governance by the general 
membership once the organization reached a certain size, this does not explain 
why either trading companies, or towns, guilds, kingdoms or institutions of the 
Church, would employ a board, council or parliament, rather than an autocratic 
governance structure under just executive officials.  Indeed, representative 
institutions declined, and autocratic rule increased, in kingdoms, towns and the 
Church in much of Europe following the Middle Ages.383
The origins of the corporate board also provides some support for 
Professor Bainbridge's argument that the reason for boards lies in the superiority 
of groups in making decisions involving judgment.  As discussed earlier, a 
common task for town councils, guild councils, parliaments, and early trading 
company boards was the adjudication of disputes.384  This seems to reflect the 
notion that groups are more likely to get the correct result in ferreting out truth 
than would an individual judge.385  Also, the tradition of consultation and 
consensus that formed part of the basis for the development of medieval 
381
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
382
 See note __ supra.
383
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
384
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
385
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
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parliaments386 seems to have arisen not just out of ideas of consent, but also out 
of the feudal obligation of nobles to provide advice to the king.387  Underlying 
the obligation to provide advice must be some notion of the superiority of groups 
over individuals in making decisions.  Nor was the idea that groups might reach 
superior decisions over individuals merely implicit in medieval political thinking.  
Rather, this concept was a central tenet in the writings of the noted medieval 
political philosopher, Marsiglio of Padua.  For example, in his work, Defender of 
the Peace, Marsiglio argued that the best laws came from the entire collective 
(universitas civium) because "when the whole corporation of citizens is directed 
towards something with its intellect and sympathy, the truth of that object is 
judged more certainly and its common utility weighed more carefully."388 Still, 
despite all this being said, it is critical to keep in mind that the proposition that 
groups, such as boards, make decisions superior to those made by an individual 
leader (with, of course, advice) was a highly contested claim in medieval Europe, 
as it remains to the present.389  Indeed, Marsiglio of Padua was condemned as a 
heretic, and was not that influential at the time he wrote.390
It is clear that some representative institutions in medieval Europe had 
the purpose, at least in part, of mediating between various constituencies, thus 
supporting the notion that corporate boards exist in order to mediate between 
various corporate claimants.391  Yet, the medieval representative institutions that 
had a mediating role, such as the parliaments and some town councils, contained 
representatives from various constituencies.392  So, for example, the French 
Estates General and provincial Estates take their name from the presence of 
representatives of three classes -- nobility, clergy, and burghers -- that made up 
medieval society (at least in the view of the time).393  By contrast, solely the 
members of the company typically elected trading company boards,394 and there 
is no suggestion that such boards represented anyone else.  Moreover, the active 
role often taken by the general membership in the early corporations -- as seen in 
the examples of the Russia Company,395 and the Virginia Company (with its 
quarterly meetings of the general membership)396 -- is inconsistent with the 
notion that early boards had any power to act as neutral arbiters in order to 
protect various stakeholders in the corporate enterprise from the shareholders.  
Finally, while shareholders with a larger stake in the venture may well have 
ended up on the early boards, the fact that voting in proportion to ownership 
arose only later397 suggests that early boards were not primarily vehicles to 
ensure that large, albeit non-controlling, shareholders could elect themselves or 
386
 See text accompanying notes __ supra.
387 E.g., Colish, supra note __ at 345.
388 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 93 (quoting Marsiglio, Defender of the Peace I.xii).
389
390 E.g., Black, supra note __ at 86, 95. 
391
 Albeit, these political institutions would have been more focused on mediating over whom would 
pay how much taxes or the like, than over whom would receive how much distributions from a venture.
392
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
393
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
394
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
395
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
396
 See text accompanying note __ supra.
397
 For example, in the case of the East India Company, not until a half century, or perhaps even a 
century, after the company began.  See text accompanying note __ supra.
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their nominees to protect their interests.
Significantly, the rationale for corporate boards most favored by modern 
scholars -- that boards exist to monitor management on behalf of passive 
investors -- is the rationale that finds the least support in the historical origins of 
the corporate board.  This is because the board-centered model of corporate 
governance did not originate in the joint stock company with its passive 
investors.  Instead, it was a form of governance that the joint stock company 
inherited when it evolved out of the regulated companies, like the Merchant 
Adventurers or Merchants of the Staple.  In such regulated companies, the 
members each conducted their own businesses, and, hence, hardly needed the 
protection of a board to monitor the managers running the company.  Instead of 
having an oversight function, the role of the board in these earliest trading 
companies was legislative (passing ordinances to regulate the membership) and 
adjudicative (hearing disputes involving the members).398
Of course, the fact that the original boards did not have a monitoring 
function on behalf of passive investors does not mean that the board did not 
evolve into this primary responsibility as the regulated companies evolved into 
the joint stock companies.  History and biology are replete with institutions and 
organisms that originated with one purpose and then successfully migrated into a 
different function.  Yet, as discussed at the beginning of this paper, the record of 
the board as an institution to monitor management on behalf of passive 
shareholders has not been one of unmitigated success.399  Perhaps the historical 
origin of the corporate board helps explain why.  Specifically, since the board 
was not designed originally as a monitoring tool, one should not be totally 
surprised if boards turn out not to be all that effective as a means to monitor 
management.  Moreover, the political origins of the corporate board suggest a 
further problem boards faced when they evolved into a tool to monitor 
management.  Medieval political thinking contained an unresolved tension 
between preferences for hierarchical versus collective decision-making.400  Most 
especially, as witnessed in the events before and after the Council of Constance, 
the issue of whether a representative body could call the Pope, king or other chief 
official to account, was highly contested.401  Of course, the legal issue of the 
corporate board's power over the CEO is now resolved beyond all doubt in the 
board's favor.402  Nevertheless, the norm of deference to the CEO that pervades
corporate board culture renders boards reluctant to assert their supremacy.403
Might it be fair to speculate that at least some of this hesitancy reflects the 
awkward melding of hierarchical and representative ideas lingering still from the 
medieval political heritage of the corporate board?
While the historical and political origins of the corporate board of 
directors provides conflicting evidence regarding the various purposes modern 
commentators claim for the board, these origins suggest a critical function which 
modern commentators seem to have overlooked.  This function is providing 
398
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political legitimacy.  The unifying theme behind medieval parliaments, town 
councils, guild councils, councils of the Church, and the boards of the trading 
companies, is that they provided the means to comply with the "corporate law" 
rule that "what touches all shall be consented to by all," in circumstances when 
consent by assembly of the entire group was impractical.404  While the rationale 
for this rule of consent may have included the notion that wiser decisions result 
from consent of the entire group (or at least from a group of representatives), or 
that the requirement of consent by all (or the representatives of all) allowed 
various constituents to protect their interests, or that the requirement of consent 
served as a check on possible misdeeds of the ruler, there also seems to be the 
notion that legitimate authority requires consent, regardless of the impact of 
consent on the quality of decisions and governance.
Indeed, once we start looking at the role of the board in terms of political 
legitimacy, it is possible to identify the achievements of the institution, and the 
reasons for its continued existence, despite a rather modest record in terms of 
achieving goals of wealth maximization and business efficiency.  An irony of the 
development of the trading company boards is that this occurred as representative 
political institutions were waning in Europe.  At the end of the middle ages, 
parliamentary assemblies receded in the face of the growing power of monarchs 
in Spain and France, and princes in Italy and Germany.405  After Constance, 
Papal authority grew triumphant over councils in the Church.406  Town councils 
fell in favor of princes in Italian cities, and royal bureaucrats in France.407
Hence, an unheralded achievement of corporate boards may have been to help 
preserve medieval traditions of representative institutions at a time when those 
institutions were under siege elsewhere.  Moreover, not only did the trading 
company boards help preserve medieval political ideas of governance involving 
representative institutions, the trading companies also spread those ideas into 
new political venues.  Of particular importance for an American law review 
article, it is worth recalling the discussion earlier of role of the Massachusetts 
Bay and Virginia companies in transplanting a board governance model into 
colonial political institutions.408
It is also possible to recognize the importance of the political legitimacy 
provided by the corporate board of directors when one considers the nineteenth 
century history of American corporate law.  One of the common themes of this 
history is the concern of state governments and political leaders about the power 
of corporations.409  For example, in contrast to worrying about undercapitalized 
corporations, New York's pioneering general incorporation law limited the 
maximum amount of capital corporations could raise to $100,000.410  Image, in 
this light, the reaction of legislatures asked to enact general incorporation statutes 
had the governance model for such entities explicitly provided that unelected, 
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unaccountable, managers would have control over this economic power.411
In an era, like the present, in which it is popular to talk of the corporation 
as nothing more than a "nexus of contracts,"412 commentators might dismiss a 
role for the board in providing political legitimacy, as mistakenly treating 
corporations like "little republics."413  Yet, to dismiss the goal of political 
legitimacy is to ignore the history of the corporation and of the board of 
directors.  The question thus becomes have attitudes toward corporations and 
corporate boards so changed that the goal of political legitimacy is no longer 
relevant.  If so, then one might conclude that the corporate board of directors is a 
largely useless, if mostly harmless, institution carried on out of inertia (in other 
words, the corporate equivalent of tonsils).  Indeed, the original draft of this 
paper, presented at a corporate law roundtable jointly sponsored by U.C.L.A. and 
the University of Southern California, suggested this conclusion.  Yet, in 
presenting the paper at the roundtable, I found myself viscerally uncomfortable 
with this position.  In asking myself why, I realized that it is because I am a
product of a culture which includes, among its values, the ideas of consent and 
representation that arose in medieval European political institutions and are still 
reflected in the corporate board of directors.  I confess that, as a shareholder, I 
practice rational apathy and trash proxy statements.  Yet, I favor proposals (even 
broader than that recently floated by Securities Exchange Commission414) to 
require corporate proxies include the name of director candidates nominated by 
shareholders -- not because I expect any improvement in corporate performance, 
but because this is more consistent with democratic ideals.415  What this suggests 
is that the reason the board of directors endures is because human beings, even in 
the business context, do not divorce their notions of how to run a business from 
their broader political and cultural ideas,416 and that the idea of consent through 
elected representatives is so ingrained in our culture that shareholders expect it 
even if they do not take advantage of it.
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